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I. SCOPE OF ENGAGEMENT AND REPORT 
1. At the request of Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., I was asked to determine the fair value 
per common share of Aruba Networks, Inc. (“Aruba” or the “Company”) as of May 18, 2015, as 
defined in the appraisal rights statute, Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. 
The date of the valuation represents the date on which Aspen Acquisition Sub, Inc., a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Hewlett-Packard Company (“HP”), merged with and into Aruba, and Aruba 
became a wholly-owned subsidiary of HP. 
2. The term “fair value” as used in this report is defined as the amount “the 
stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate 
interest in a going concern. By value of the stockholder’s proportionate interest in the corporate 
enterprise is meant the true or intrinsic value of his stock which has been taken by the merger.”
1
 
This amount excludes synergies, i.e., it is exclusive of any element of value arising from the 
accomplishment or expectation of the combination of the merged enterprises. 
3. I submit this report in accordance with rules of the Court of Chancery of the State 
of Delaware. The analysis and opinions contained herein are based on information available as of 
the date of this report. I reserve the right to supplement and/or amend this report should any 
additional information become available. The professional fees for my services are not 
contingent upon the outcome of this matter or the opinions expressed herein. This report presents 
a summary of my methodologies, findings, and conclusions. 
II. SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS 
4. I, Paul Marcus, am the Managing Member of PM Financial Expert Consultants, 
LLC (“PMFEC”), a Needham, Massachusetts-based firm focused on providing dispute and 
                                                 
1
 Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950). 




corporate finance consulting services primarily to companies and their counsel.  I am a 
professional with over 30 years of experience in advising clients in commercial disputes or 
litigation, corporate finance, mergers and acquisitions, security and business valuation, solvency 
analysis, investment decision making, performing independent fundamental research and due 
diligence, strategic planning and financial analysis, raising and providing capital, and 
originating, structuring, and negotiating complex financial transactions.  I hold an M.B.A. from 
the University of Chicago Booth School of Business with a specialization in finance and a 
concentration in accounting, and a B.S. from Tufts University.  I have served as an Adjunct 
(Part-Time) faculty member in the Finance Department at the Carroll School of Management at 
Boston College teaching Mergers & Acquisitions.  I also hold the Chartered Financial Analyst 
designation granted by the CFA Institute, the Certified Fraud Examiner designation granted by 
the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, and successfully completed a formal credit 
training program at Bank of America. 
5. As a practitioner, I have analyzed hundreds of businesses, including a detailed 
study of their historical and projected performance for purposes of evaluating valuation, 
solvency, lending, investment, advising on financial strategy, merger and acquisition analysis, 
financial restructuring, dispute resolution, and others.  In my lending roles I have been involved 
in underwriting in excess of $1 billion of financing.  Further, as an investment banker, I advised 
companies (including shareholders and boards of directors) on buying and selling businesses, 
and I advised companies and individuals on raising in excess of $300 million in debt and equity 
financing. As a dispute consultant, I have been called upon to value businesses and securities, 
review small business underwriting practices, develop an understanding of complex financial 
transactions and the practical economic results of those transactions, and numerous other 




topics.  I have been involved with companies in several industries including but not limited to 
technology (hardware and software), biotechnology, manufacturing, distribution, financial 
services, professional services, utilities and energy, telecommunications, and textiles. 
6. Additionally, I have provided consulting and expert services to numerous 
attorneys and companies on matters of business modeling and projecting, capital formation 
including debt and equity financing, valuation, solvency, damages, lost profits, corporate 
finance, and others.  I have also served as a financial analyst and consultant to numerous 
companies on private placement of debt and equity, mergers and acquisitions, business valuation, 
leveraged buyouts, and debt restructuring.  I have been qualified as an expert to testify in six 
Federal Court trials, a Delaware Chancery Court trial, and a AAA Arbitration on a variety of 
topics including but not limited to:  small business loan underwriting practices, the use of 
complex financial transactions for hedging purposes, financial analysis and calculation of 
damages relating to the valuation of companies and securities, solvency, and others.  I have made 
presentations on understanding financial statements, valuation, financial statement analysis, 
solvency, financing strategy, and exit strategies for business owners to business groups and law 
firms. 
7. A copy of my current curriculum vitae, which summarizes my qualifications and 
professional experience and includes a list of my deposition, arbitration, and trial testimony over 
at least the past five years, is attached as Appendix A to this report. The list of documents and 
other information I relied upon in performing my analysis set forth below is attached as 
Appendix B. 
8. The Michel-Shaked Group is being compensated for my time at an hourly rate of 
$575.  Other Michel-Shaked Group staff is being compensated at hourly rates ranging from $110 




to $575 per hour for staff that assists me depending upon the level of the professional staff 
involved.   
III. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS 
9. I determined the fair value of Aruba’s stock as of May 18, 2015 (the “valuation 
date”) by performing a discounted cash flow (“DCF”) valuation. Based on the DCF valuation I 
performed, it is my opinion that the fair value of Aruba’s common stock as of May 18, 2015 was 
$32.57 per share. 
10. As a test of the reasonableness of my findings using the DCF valuation, I 
performed two other valuation methodologies: (1) the Market Approach – Comparable Company 
Valuation and (2) the Market Approach – Comparable Transaction Valuation. The results of the 
Comparable Company Valuation support the result of my DCF valuation. The Comparable 
Transaction Valuation did not produce enough reliable data to render it a meaningful check of 
my DCF valuation. 
IV. OVERVIEW OF ARUBA NETWORKS, INC. 
11. The following section of this report provides a background discussion on the 
Company and the impact that the evolution in wireless technology has had on the Company. 
 DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPANY2 A.
12. As of the valuation date, Aruba developed, marketed, and sold products and 
services that addressed customers’ enterprise mobility and Wireless Local Area Network 
                                                 
2
 Based primarily on Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended July 31, 2014 
(“2014 10-K”) unless otherwise noted. 






 needs and was a leading provider of such services to the mobile enterprise. Through 
its Mobility-Defined Networks
TM
, the Company provided a reliable network solution for 
information technology (“IT”) departments and the ever increasing number of workers who rely 
on mobile devices and Internet connectivity to do their work and for personal communication 
needs.
4
 (The Company refers to this generation as “Gen Mobile”). 
13. The Company was founded in 2002 by an executive team that consisted of 
industry veterans in the areas of wireless, security, and enterprise networking.
5
 The Company is 
headquartered in Sunnyvale, California and has operations throughout the Americas, Europe, 
Middle East, and Africa (“EMEA”), and the Asia Pacific (“APAC”).  Prior to its acquisition by 
HP, Aruba was led by President, Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), and Chairman of the Board 
of Directors (“Aruba Board”) Dominic Orr (“Orr”) and Co-Founder and Chief Technology 
Officer (“CTO”) Keerti Melkote (“Melkote”). Aruba shipped its first commercial products in 
June 2003 and raised $88 million by issuing 8 million shares in its initial public offering (“IPO”) 




14. At the time Aruba was formed, IT departments primarily relied on three “fixed 
edge” solutions to provide workers the ability to be mobile while still being able to connect to 
the firm’s network: 1) traditional WLAN, 2) open access to fixed points, and 3) Virtual Private 
                                                 
3
 Wi-Fi is a technology that allows electronic devices to connect to a WLAN primarily using the 
2.4 Gigaherz and 5 Gigaherz ISM radio bands. As generally used today, Wi-Fi is synonymous 
with WLAN. 
4
 Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 8-K, February 26, 2015. 
5
 Aruba Networks, Inc. Offering Prospectus for 8,000,000 shares of Common Stock, March 26, 
2007 (“IPO Prospectus”), p. 28. 
6
 IPO Prospectus, p.1 and p.3. 




Networks (“VPNs”).  Traditional WLANs were fundamentally designed for extending the wired 
ports within a physical building by extending the fixed network services over the air as opposed 
to adapting them to roam with the user. Some companies relied on open access to fixed ports to 
provide their users with some form of mobility. In these environments, when the user moves 
away from their primary network port (e.g., desk) to another location in the office, the user must 
find a port and cable to connect to the network. VPNs offer employees secure mobile access to 
the enterprise network by requiring IT managers to install, configure and maintain client 
software on the end-user’s machine.
7
 
15. These solutions extended the “fixed edge” of the existing network on a limited 
basis and often resulted in reduced security and sub-optimal application performance. By 
recognizing these limitations when Wi-Fi technology was at an early stage of development, 
Aruba became a leading provider of an alternative to these approaches to providing employees 
with mobility. 
16. As of the valuation date, Aruba’s Mobility-Defined NetworksTM was “a 
fundamentally new network architecture  designed to automatically optimize infrastructure-wide 
performance and trigger security actions that previously required manual intervention”
 8
 by IT 
managers. At the time of its merger with HP, Aruba identified four key ingredients for its all-
wireless workplace: 1) Stable Air, 2) Secure Air, 3) Simple Air, and 4) Smart Air.
9
  The all-
wireless network needs to provide Wi-Fi that does not slow down as more users connect to the 
network (Stable Air), that secures the data and the devices without overwhelming the IT network 
                                                 
7
 IPO Prospectus, p. 2. 
8
 2014 10-K, p.4. 
9
 Company Overview, February 17, 2015, p. 6 (ARUN006122). 




(Secure Air), that is simple to manage (Simple Air), and that allow users, devices and 
applications, and locations to empower new applications (Smart Air). 
17. As the Company reported in its 2014 annual report, it believed that the market for 
mobility solutions was changing and anticipated a significant growth in mobile devices. The 
increasing bring-your-own-device (“BYOD”) phenomenon contributed to that growth and 
required firms to provide networks that allow mobility.
10
 
18. As a result of Aruba’s architecture solutions, the Company was well positioned to 
address the market opportunity brought about by the evolution in wireless technology from 2003 
to the valuation date. For the period 2003 to 2009, Aruba characterized the wireless market as 
primarily serving laptop computers with Wi-Fi protocols 802.11abg.
11
 802.11 refers to a set of 
standards for WLAN equipment as established by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (“IEEE”). The different letters following 802.11 refer to different wireless protocols. 
19. From 2010 to 2013, the wireless market was defined as providing guest access to 
the network as well as for BYOD with Wi-Fi protocols 802.11n. By 2014, the gateway to access 
an all-wireless office accelerated with the development of the 802.11ac protocol. According to 
International Data Corporation (“IDC”): 
“The 802.11ac standard for WLAN is well on its way to being the fastest-adopted 
WLAN standard in history. Initially expected to overtake 802.11n in terms of 
enterprise shipments and revenue in 2016, recently quarterly trends are showing 
that the actual inflection point will likely come in 1H15 for revenue and follow 
shortly thereafter for shipments.”
12
 
The 802.11ac standard is characterized as follows: 
                                                 
10
 2014 10-K, p.4. 
11
 Company Overview, October 2014, p. 19 (ArubaAA0461186). 
12
 “Worldwide Enterprise Communications and Datacenter Network Infrastructure 2015 Top 10 
Predictions,” IDC, January 2015, p. 6 (ArubaAA0349480). 




“The newest generation of Wi-Fi signaling in popular use, 802.11ac utilizes dual 
band wireless technology, supporting simultaneous connections on both the 2.4 
GHz and 5 GHz Wi-Fi bands.  802.11ac offers backward compatibility to 
802.11b/g/n and bandwidth rated up to 1300 Mbps on the 5 GHz band plus up to 
450 Mbps on 2.4 GHz.”
13
 
20. As of the valuation date, creating an all-wireless network was more achievable 
than before and Aruba was well positioned to benefit from this evolution in Wi-Fi technology. At 
that time, two leading technology research firms (Forrester and Gartner) recognized that the 
Company was a leader in market innovation.  
21. As of the valuation date, the Forrester WAVETM analysis indicated that Aruba 




                                                 
13
 http://compnetworking.about.com/cs/wireless80211/a/aa80211standard.htm  
14
 Company Overview, February 17, 2015, p. 5 (ARUN006121). 




22. The Forrester WAVETM for WLAN Solutions report evaluates vendors on several 
architectural characteristics (scalable, shared, simplified, standardized and secure) and also 
considers strategy and market presence. In a September 10, 2014 news release announcing the 
release of the Forrester Wave™ for Wireless Local Area Network (LAN) Solutions for 2014, 
Aruba’s Chief Marketing Officer Ben Gilson was quoted as stating “Our Mobility-Defined 
Networks are allowing customers to meet the needs of #GenMobile employees in a way that is 
cost-effective for their organizations. Our approach has already been embraced by customers 




23. Gartner’s Magic Quadrant similarly recognized that Aruba was a leader for Wired 
and WLAN as of the valuation date: 
 








1. Revenues, Cost of Revenues, and Operating Expenses 
24. As of the valuation date, Aruba’s products and services were sold to more than 
40,000 customers worldwide, primarily in the United States, EMEA, and APAC. The following 
table summarizes the generally stable geographic distribution of the Company’s revenue stream: 
 
25. As of the valuation date, the Company sold its products through its own sales 
force and through a multi-tier distribution model. The Company’s Value Added Distributors 
(“VADs”) and Original Equipment Manufacturers (“OEMs”) sold Aruba’s products and a 
variety of support services to a diverse number of Value Added Resellers (“VARs”), systems 
integrators, and service providers. The customer base included enterprise (general/high 
technology/industrial), higher education, K-12 education, health care, retail, government 
(federal/state/local), financial services, and hospitality. The following chart provides a 
breakdown of the Company’s revenue base for the 2014 fiscal year (“FY”) ended July 31, 2014 
(“FY 2014”): 
($000s)
United States 323,331$   63% 379,447$   63% 476,114$   65%
Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) 89,540       17% 106,427     18% 132,847     18%
Asia Pacific (APAC) 89,677       17% 94,361       16% 102,666     14%
Rest of World 14,221       3% 19,809       3% 17,306       2%
     Total 516,769$   100% 600,044$   100% 728,933$   100%
Source: Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended July 31, 2014, p. 95.
For the Fiscal Years Ended July 31,
2012 2013 2014





26. For FY 2014, the Company’s product mix consisted of Campus Access Points 
(“APs”) (47%), Instant (19%), Software (18%), Controllers (11%), and Switches (4%).
16
 
Campus APs allowed enterprises to create a secure and simple Wi-Fi network for their campus 
locations (e.g., college campuses, corporate office campuses). Aruba Instant products provided 
enterprise grade Wi-Fi to an existing wired LAN, with set-up taking clients just a few minutes.
17
 
Aruba’s software products were used in tandem with its hardware products to provide network 
access control and network management. The Meridian App platform was a software solution 
that sent Wi-Fi network users personalized push notifications to their mobile devices. Controllers 
provided Aruba’s customers with network engineering services as well as policy controls. 
                                                 
16
 Company Overview, October 2014, p. 74 (ArubaAA0461241). 
17
Aruba Networks, “Aruba Instant: Combining Enterprise class Wi-Fi with unmatched 
affordability and configuration simplicity,” p. 4, 






Combined U.S. Federal and Other government


















FY 2014 Customer Base




Switches connected network devices, receiving, processing, and forwarding the appropriate data 
to the network device.
18
  
27. The Company outsourced the majority of its manufacturing. Its major 
manufacturing partners were Accton, Flextronics, Sercomm, and Wistron NeWeb Corp. In 
addition, Flextronics facilities in Singapore and Venray, Netherlands were used for production of 
specialized products and fulfillment operations for orders destined to EMEA and APAC.  
28. Research and development was primarily conducted in Sunnyvale, California, 
Bangalore and Chennai, India, and Beijing, China. As of January 2015, the Company had 
approximately 1,800 employees worldwide as summarized in the following table: 
 
                                                 
18
 http://www.arubanetworks.com/products/networking/  
Worldwide Base of Employees as of January 2015
% of
Location R&D Sales CA Marketing CFO Ops IT Other* Total Total
HQ 264      39           37           30           45         29          23       41         508      28%
Other Americas 27        356         24           5             7           1            -      10         430      24%
EMEA -       154         7             7             15         2            -      8           193      11%
APAC 386      135         57           8             28         11          23       18         666      37%
Total 677      684         125         50           95         43          46       77         1,797   100%
% of Total 38% 38% 7% 3% 5% 2% 3% 4% 100%
* Includes Human Resources, Sales Operations, Training, Legal, Business Development, and Office of CEO.
Source: Company Overview, February 17, 2015, p. 8 (ARUN006124).
Field Operations Operations




29. The table below summarizes the Company’s employee growth from FY 2009 to 
FY 2014: 
 
2. Management and Board of Directors19 
30. As of the valuation date, Orr was the Company’s CEO and Chairman of the 
Aruba Board. He had served as a Director since 2002 and became President and CEO in April 
2006.  
31. Melkote co-founded Aruba, and as of the valuation date was the Company’s CTO 
and a Director on the Aruba Board. 
32. As of the valuation date, the Aruba Board was comprised of six other individuals, 
including Lead Independent Director Daniel Warmenhoven (“Warmenhoven”). Warmenhoven 
had served as a Director of the Company since 2006 and became the Lead Independent Director 
in October 2009. 
33. Michael Galvin (“Galvin”) joined Aruba in July 2005 and served as the 
Company’s Senior Director of Finance until November 2008. In December 2008, Galvin became 
Vice President, Finance; in April 2011, he became the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”).  
                                                 
19
 Based on the 2014 10-K. 
Worldwide Base of Employees
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Sales & Marketing 260         300         422         520         580         723         
Research & Development 177         254         426         471         586         655         
General & Administrative 55           66           111         131         166         201         
Customer Services 33           40           65           66           103         131         
Operations 20           21           33           35           38           44           
Total 545         681         1,057      1,223      1,473      1,754      
Source: Company filings with the SEC.
As of the Fiscal Year Ended July 31




34. Ava Hahn (“Hahn”) was the Company’s General Counsel and frequently served 
as the Secretary of the Aruba Board meetings.
20
 
3. Acquisition History21 
35. Aruba acquired businesses or technologies to stimulate growth, enhance existing 
product offerings, acquire additional talented employees, and/or to enable the Company to 
develop new solutions. Between September 2010 and the valuation date, Aruba acquired the 
following companies: Azalea Networks, Inc. (“Azalea”), Avenda Systems (“Avenda”), and 
Meridian Apps, Inc. (“Meridian”). 
36. In September 2010, Aruba bought Azalea for $42.0 million plus Contingent 
Rights estimated to be worth $9.5 million at the time of the transaction. Azalea was a leading 
supplier of outdoor mesh networks critical for outdoor industrial networking applications. Its 
products were used in the 2008 Beijing Olympics to provide voice, video, and Wi-Fi access over 
a 19 square mile area. Previously, Aruba had focused on providing indoor WLAN solutions. This 
acquisition allowed the Company to expand its business to include outdoor solutions.
22
 
37. In November 2011, the Company acquired Avenda, a developer of network 
security solutions, for $35.5 million in cash and stock. Avenda provided secure network access 
solutions for BYOD users. This acquisition was expected to provide Aruba’s customers with a 
simple solution for BYOD network access. Avenda’s products allowed mobile devices on a 
                                                 
20
 For example, see Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Directors of Aruba Networks, Inc., 
September 2, 2014 (ArubaAA0001780 – 1781). 
21
 Based on the 2014 10-K, unless otherwise noted. 
22
Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 8-K, May 10, 2010, Exhibit 99.1.  




broad range of operating systems to securely and quickly connect to a network without the need 
for IT helpdesk assistance.
23
 
38. In May 2013, the Company bought Meridian, a company that supplied mobile 
software for location-based services, for $16.8 million in cash. This software came in the form of 
applications for mobile phones or tablets, which provided turn-by-turn directions and other 
location-based services. It was used by business enterprises to engage with potential customers 
through their mobile phones. This acquisition represented a new business opportunity for Aruba. 
The Company planned to offer new location-based services by combining its own network 
technology and data with Meridian’s Wi-Fi based applications and solutions.
24
 
 HISTORICAL FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE B.
39. Prior to the merger, Aruba operated on a FY ending July 31, such that its quarters 
ended on October 31 (Q1), January 31 (Q2), April 30 (Q3) and July 31 (Q4). The following is a 
discussion of Aruba’s annual financial performance over the five-year period ending July 31, 
2014 and for the quarters ended October 31, 2014 (“Q1 2015”) and January 31, 2015 (“Q2 
2015”). Q1 2015 and Q2 2015 represent the first two quarters of the fiscal year ended July 31, 
2015 (“FY 2015”). 
1. Fiscal Years 2010 - 2014 
40. As seen in Exhibit 1-1, Aruba consistently grew its products and services revenue 
in FY 2010 – FY 2014. Exhibits 1-2 through 1-4 present Aruba’s historical income statements, 
balance sheets, and statements of cash flows. During this time period, the Company also 
increased its market share of WLAN equipment revenue worldwide. For example, as reported by 
                                                 
23
 Aruba Networks, Inc Form 8-K, November 17, 2011, Exhibit 99.2. 
24
 Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-Q for the quarter ended April 30, 2013, p. 22. 




Gartner, Aruba had a 14.6% share of Q4 2014 WLAN equipment sales, up from its Q4 2013 
market share of 12.7%.
25
 Over this same year, Aruba maintained its second place position behind 
Cisco Systems and increased its market share over the third place vendor.  The Company’s 
customer base grew significantly over FYs 2009 – 2014: 
 
41. Aruba referred to its product gross margins as “Industry Leading.”26 As seen in 
Exhibit 2-1, the Company’s product gross margins increased from 62.0% at Q1 2009 to 70% at 
Q2 2015, as the Company focused on improving its operating income. Throughout FY 2014, 
Aruba reported record revenue and improving margins. Aruba’s Q3 2014 earnings release stated: 
                                                 
25
 Market Share: Enterprise Network Equipment by Market Segment, Worldwide reports for 
4Q14 and 2014 and 4Q13 and 2013 (ArubaAA0360733-734 and ArubaAA0464292-293). 
26




























“Record revenue of $188.8M grew 28% from the $147.1M reported in Q3’13. 
* * * 
‘We delivered record revenue driven by strong demand across our product 
portfolio,’ said Dominic Orr, Aruba’s president and chief executive officer. ‘We 
believe our exceptional topline performance this quarter reflects the investment 
we made in extending our sales and channel capacity, coupled with the strength of 
our differentiated architecture and product portfolio. The need for simple, smart, 
secure and stable Wi-Fi, particularly for cutting edge organizations moving 




42. While Aruba’s stock was trading at $17.95 after the Q3 2014 earnings call with 
security analysts, many security analysts had higher price targets (“PTs”), with the median PT at 
$24.00. Exhibit 3-1 summarizes security analysts’ PTs following Q3 2014 earnings. 
43. On August 26, 2014, Aruba issued a press release reporting record revenue in 
both the quarter ended July 31, 2014 (“Q4 2014”) and for FY 2014. In an internal email to Aruba 
employees, Orr reported on the Company’s performance: 
“We had another strong quarter during which we made meaningful progress on 
our key strategic priorities. Our results exceeded guidance on all fronts, with 
record revenue of $202.9 million, an increase of 33% from last year. We met our 
commitment to deliver 20% operating margin by the end of the year and delivered 
gross margin of 71.5%, an improvement from the prior quarter.”
28
 
44. The Company also reported that its non-generally accepted accounting principles 
(“Non-GAAP”) operating margin improved by 530 basis points (5.30%) over the last four 
                                                 
27
 Aruba Networks, Inc. Fiscal Third Quarter 2014 Earnings Release (ArubaAA0518231) (Orr 
Ex. 5). 
28
 Email from Dominic Orr to Aruba employees, Subject: Important Message from Dom, August 
26, 2014 (ArubaAA0115422-32) (Orr Ex. 7). 






 Following the Company’s earnings announcement, security analysts at J.P. Morgan 
Securities wrote: 
“We are throwing in the towel on our Underweight thesis for Aruba as datapoints 
continue to suggest that the competitive threat from Cisco is not materializing. 
We also see both new 802.11ac capable smartphones and increased E-Rate K-12 
Wifi spending in 2015 as potential tailwinds.”
30
 
45. In summarizing the Company’s performance for FY 2014, in his letter to 
stockholders, Orr noted the Company’s shift in focusing on profitability: 
“While strong growth remains a core priority, we have reached a stage in the 
company’s evolution where our financial model allows us to shift our focus to 
driving growth with improved profitability. 
Looking to Fiscal 2015, we are excited about our opportunity to increase 
shareholder value. With solid growth expected in the WLAN market, 




46. As part of the August 26, 2014 press release, the Company announced that it had 
implemented a plan to improve its profitability through a cost reduction initiative known 
internally as “Project Greyhound.”  The press release stated that Aruba expected the cost 
reduction to eliminate approximately 3.7% of its workforce and to relocate approximately 4.2% 
of its workforce to Aruba operations in Portland, Oregon, Bangalore, India and Cork, Ireland. In 
part due to Project Greyhound, the Company raised its FY 2015 Non-GAAP operating margin 
target from 21% to 22%.
32
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47. Project Greyhound was designed to address certain criticisms lodged by analysts 
as the Company matured.  As Aruba’s revenue growth matured and the Company started to 
become profitable, securities analysts began to focus on Aruba’s ability to grow earnings 
alongside revenue. As Galvin explained during his deposition, “[w]hen you are a high-growth 
company, a top-line revenue growth company, you are given a bit of a hall pass, if you will, on 
operating profitability because they believed you are becoming bigger and bigger and bigger and 
down the road your margin will figure itself out. But you are taking so much revenue and so 
much market share that they give you a break on what your operating margins might be, what 
your EPS growth might be.”
33  
When HP first approached Aruba, the Company was nearing the 
stage where its “hall pass” was going to be revoked as securities analysts began to demand both 
revenue growth and earnings growth.
34
 
48. In the months preceding HP’s approach, Aruba management expressed frustration 
that despite record revenues and strong performance, Aruba’s stock price did not trade at a price 
reflective of what they believed the Company was worth.
35
  
49. To achieve a share price that reflected Aruba’s intrinsic value, management 
turned its focus to showing the operating leverage – i.e., having increasingly higher percentages 
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of revenue fall to the bottom line to show increased earnings per share – that securities analysts 
demanded.  Project Greyhound was planned “in direct response to generating better operating 
leverage for the company, reducing operating expense, and making [Aruba’s] operating margins 
better.”
36
   
50. While Aruba announced Project Greyhound to the market on August 26, 2014, 
along with its FY 2014 earnings, Galvin testified that he expected that it would take a couple of 
quarters for the impact of Project Greyhound to be felt such that the “operating model question” 
would be behind Aruba and such that security analysts would come to believe that Aruba was 
“committed” to showing operating leverage.
37
  
51. As seen in Exhibit 4-1, the market reacted favorably to the Company’s Q4 2014 
and FY 2014 financial results and improved guidance. Security analysts covering Aruba 
commented on the Company’s financial performance and improved outlook. For example, 
Goldman, Sachs & Co. reported: 
“Aruba’s better than expected quarter was driven by strong product revenue as the 
company continues to gain share in the 11ac product cycle 
* * * 
Aruba guided Fl Q revenue of $202-205mn (26% yoy at the midpoint), implying 
sequentially flat product revenue. We believe this guidance bakes in conservatism 
due to both a strong F4Q and an emerging FlQ seasonality as the company is 
getting close to a $1bn revenue run-rate. The company increased its FY15 OM 
guidance to 21-22% from 19-21 %, driven by both expectation of continued 
topline strength and headcount restructuring.”
38
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52. Similarly, Bank of America Merrill Lynch wrote: 
“Big wins; cost cutting to drive OM strength in FY15 
Strong demand for the AC, Instant, and Clear Pass products helped drive wins at a 
large biopharmaceutical company, 2,000+ branches for a US bank, and several 
large school districts. Strength, as we have seen with other WLAN companies 
recently, is driven by the AC adoption cycle and we expect this trend to continue 
supporting Aruba’s top line. Management also announced plans to reduce ~4% of 
the workforce and relocate positions (primarily G&A) to lower cost areas such as 
India, Ireland, and its Oregon office. The company also highlighted a partnership 




53. After the announcement of the Company’s Q4 2014 earnings, 16 security analysts 
had established PTs above the $24.67 deal price. Furthermore, the median PT was $25.00, also 
above the deal price. Exhibit 3-1 is a summary of security analysts’ PTs at this point in time.
40
 
Furthermore, as previously discussed, Galvin expected security analysts to take a couple of 




2. Q1 2015 
54. On November 20, 2014, Aruba issued a press release reporting financial results 
for Q1 2015. The Company reported record revenue for the quarter, growing 29% over the prior 
year period, and also reported increases and improvements in both Non-GAAP and GAAP gross 
margins and operating margins.
42
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55. Orr spoke positively about Aruba’s performance and outlook: 
“Driven by our focus on profitable growth, we generated record revenue of 
$207.8 million. This strong performance was coupled with a solid improvement in 
our profitability in the first quarter… Adoption of 802.11ac technology continued 
to drive growth in many of our verticals, including federal government, retail and 
enterprise. Our recent focus on penetrating the small to mid- sized enterprise 
market is paying off, and we are excited about the opportunity to continue to 
accelerate in this fast growing portion of the wireless market.”
43
 
56. In addition to reporting its results, the Company provided revenue guidance for 
Q2 2015 of $208 million to $212 million, the midpoint of which was approximately 1% lower 
than security analysts’ expectations of $211.75 million.
44
  
57. In response to questions about the guidance on the earnings conference call with 
security analysts, Galvin stated that the guidance the Company provided the market was based 
on a desire to be prudent in light of shifting macro factors, rather than any company specific 
issues:  
“So with regards to the guide, obviously, we do feel very good about the year-on-
year growth, the 18% to 20%. We believe both are actuals from Q1 and that 
guidance are definitely taking market share from the market. But for this quarter, 
in particular, when we looked out, we really looked at kind of the things we’re all 
hearing right now about a mixed spending and a mixed macro environment and 
we really flavored that in to our normal process of the way we evaluate our 
pipeline and conversion ratios, et cetera. And so it was really, really focused on 
that. There weren’t specific verticals or geographies per se. It was really, I 




58. Despite Galvin’s efforts to reassure the market that the lowered guidance was the 
result of prudence, the Company’s share price fell approximately 14% in response (see Exhibits 
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4-1 and 4-2). Several security analysts attributed the stock drop to the lower guidance. For 
example, Bank of America Merrill Lynch commented: 
“Strong quarter revenue beating our/Street estimates, gross and operating margins 
20bps and 130bps above our expectations, and EPS 1c better than 
expected…Nevertheless, the focal point this quarter is the weak guidance, driving 
the stock down 8% in after-hours trading.”
46
 
59. Other analysts also commented on the lowered guidance. For example, Barclays 
noted: 
 “F1Q was solid in terms of share gains, margins and cash flow against a mixed 
spending environment. Aruba also issued guidance largely in line with consensus 
for the January [2015] quarter, but it is sub-seasonal – which clearly raised some 
concerns. Obviously, all of the company’s peers in networking have issued sub-




60. Morgan Stanley noted: 
“While the company exceeded quarterly expectations for FQ1, guidance was 
generally in-line with our and Street expectations, as they see no near term 
catalysts driving outperformance and are cautious on the general spending 
environment due to macro headlines.”
48
 
61. J.P. Morgan Securities stated: 
“Aruba reported a solid quarter with a 2% beat on revenues and a 1c beat on EPS. 
Operating margin was better than consensus as we had previewed. However, the 
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62. Goldman Sachs reported: 
“Aruba executed well in F1Q and the company’s focus on profitability (including 
GAAP) is paying off. Aruba’s top-line guidance at the mid-point was slightly 
below consensus and even though we expect the company to ultimately produce 
revenue (and EPS) largely in line with consensus, we expect investors to be 
focused on moderating top-line growth going forward.”
50
 
63. After Aruba’s stock fell substantially on the lowered guidance, analysts 
questioned whether the slightly lowered guidance signaled something more than simple 
prudence.  On December 4, 2014, Aruba Vice President of Investor Relations Tonya Chin 
reported to Orr, Galvin, and Melkote on conversations she had had with sell-side and buy-side 
analysts who told Ms. Chin that “they viewed our need to take guidance down for just $1M at the 
mid-point as a directional concern as we clearly wouldn’t have done it if we didn’t feel 
concerned.”
51
  In response to this expressed concern, Orr stated, “I regret every day after the 
earnings call that I did not stick with our 209-213 guidance range.”
52
  
64. Aruba’s 2Q 2015 performance, as set forth below, makes clear that Orr safely 
could have stuck to his original range, as the Company reported “record revenue of $212.9 
million”
53
 that quarter – at the top end of the higher range.  
65. As seen in Exhibit 3, it is interesting to note that Barclays (which would later be 
retained to represent HP in connection with the acquisition of Aruba) did not change its 
overweight rating or its $25 price target (“PT”) based on this latest news from Aruba.
54
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 Aruba Networks Reports Fiscal Second Quarter 2015 Financial Results (February 26, 2015).   
54
 Compare ArubaAA0446876  - 887 (Hardegree Ex. 8) (Barclays Equity Research Report, 
Aruba Networks, Inc., Top Line Momentum Continues; Focusing More on Leverage) with 
 




Furthermore, internal HP documents suggest that the 1Q 2015 or the lower guidance for Q2 2015 
results did not have an impact on its valuation of Aruba.
55
  Furthermore, as seen in Exhibit 3-1, 
the majority of security analysts did not change their PTs following this lowered guidance. 
3. Q2 2015 
66. At the beginning of this quarter, the Company announced that for the second 




67. While official financial results for Q2 2015 would not be made public for another 
nine days, an internal Company document dated February 17, 2015 reported a 21% year-over-
year growth in Q2 2015 revenue.
57
 
68. After the market closed on February 26, 2015, the Company issued a press release 
reporting financial results for Q2 2015. Similar to Q1 2015, Aruba reported record revenue for 
the quarter, growing 21% over the prior year quarter, with increases and improvements in both 
Non-GAAP and GAAP gross margins and operating margins.
58
 In reporting these results, Orr 
stated: 
                                                                                                                                                             
ArubaAA0512469 – 483 (Hardegree Ex. 9) (Barclays  Equity Research Report, Aruba Networks, 
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 Company Overview, February 17, 2015, p. 3 (ARUN006119). 
58
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“We are pleased to report solid results for the second quarter, reflecting continued 
execution on our strategic plan… Our results were supported by continued growth 
in our key geographies, strong year-over-year performance in our Federal vertical, 
further success in penetrating the Global 2000, and increasing traction in our SME 
business. We believe we are well positioned to capitalize on the continued growth 
in WLAN, the potential opportunities from increased E- Rate funding later this 
year, and the continued 802.11ac refresh cycle.”
59
 
69. Galvin also noted that the Company’s strong revenue growth and expanding gross 
margin combined with prudent management of operating expenses led to the record quarter in 
Non-GAAP operating margin (23.3%).
60
 On February 27, 2015, Aruba’s share price rose 9.7% 
(see Exhibit 4-2). 
70. The market did not have the opportunity to digest and react independently to the 
favorable Q2 2015 financial results
61
 because on the previous day, February 25, 2015, 
Bloomberg News, citing people with knowledge of the transaction, reported that HP was in 
negotiations to buy Aruba.
62
 The report did not provide an acquisition price, but as seen in 
Exhibit 4-2, Aruba’s stock price rose 21.0% on this rumor. Trading volume in Aruba shares 
remained high from February 25, 2015 through March 2, 2015 when the transaction was 
officially announced. Before the deal price was announced, Aruba’s stock briefly traded in 
excess of the $24.67 deal price.    
71. While the market did not have an opportunity to react independently to the Q2 
2015 earnings announcement, the stock rose 9.7% following the earnings release. 
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Notwithstanding the rumored transaction leak reported by Bloomberg News, security analysts 
were able to analyze the quarter’s results and form independent opinions on Aruba’s shares. For 
example, Barclays commented in raising its PT on Aruba: 
“We think Aruba’s F2Q results demonstrate broad-based demand and solid 
execution despite tough conditions in K-12. The company is also making 
substantial progress in its efforts to demonstrate operating leverage. While the 
timing of E-rate spending hurts the F3Q outlook modestly, the guidance was 
better than feared and should ease some concerns. There are signs of pent-up 
demand, which should drive a significant acceleration in the back half of the year. 
* * * 
Our estimates move up slightly and our price target goes to $28 from $22 as we 
are more positive about the acceleration potential later this year into CY16.”
63
 
72. UBS made similar comments as Barclays in also raising its PT on Aruba: 
“Aruba delivers a beat and respectable guidance 
Aruba delivered solid results and respectable guidance especially given recent 
concerns over turnover in the sales organization and a slowdown in the education 
vertical ahead of federal funds ($1b/year) being released starting July 2015 
(retroactive reimbursement starting April).”
64
 
“Valuation: Maintain Buy and raise Price Target to $27 
Our PT is based on 20x (was 19x) our CY15 EPS estimate of $1.20 (was $1.17) 
plus $2.6/share in cash. We’ve raised our multiple on better visibility, execution, 
and expectations of sales acceleration in CY2H.”
65
 
73. Goldman, Sachs & Co. also raised its PT on Aruba to $23 from $22 based on its 
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74. Additional evidence of security analysts increasing their PTs based on Aruba’s 
future prospects and not on rumors of the acquisition include the commentary below from J.P. 
Morgan and BMO Capital Markets respectively: 




“We are raising our price target to $26 from $22 which represents 15-20x our CY 
2016 pro forma EPS estimate of $1.54.”
68
 
 ARUBA IMPLEMENTED PLANS TO LOWER ITS STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION C.
EXPENSE 
75. Personnel costs represented the largest component of Aruba’s operating expenses. 
Like many high technology companies, Aruba awarded employees throughout the Company with 
stock-based compensation (“SBC”). Stock-based awards included restricted stock units and 
awards (“RSUs”), stock options, performance-based awards, and an employee stock purchase 
plan.
69
 The Company determined the amount of SBC expense based on stock awards that it 
ultimately expected to vest, less estimated forfeiture amounts. The SBC expense was also 




76. The following table summarizes the amount of SBC expense the Company 
reported on a GAAP basis over the last five fiscal years preceding the merger with HP: 
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77. Historically, Aruba had issued SBC at a higher level than other companies in the 
industry. In an email Orr sent on June 25, 2014, he acknowledged this fact: 
“We have historically been at the very top of all comparable companies in 
granting equity to employees. In years past we’ve granted more than two times 
the amount of stock to our employees as compared to comparable companies in 
our space. Over FY14, we made significant changes in the stock plan to bring our 
stock spending more in line with our peer group.”
71
 
78. In the quarters leading up to the valuation date, Aruba was focused on lowering 
its SBC, both in terms of dollars and as a percentage of revenue, as part of its focus on increasing 
operating leverage. To that end, effective FY 15, Aruba would not be granting any SBC to 
“employees in levels 1 through and including 6.”
 72
 Similarly, Aruba publicly stated that it 
expected SBC expense in FY 2015 to be lower than FY 2014 in terms of both dollars and as a 
percentage of revenue and expected continued reductions in fiscal years 2016 and 2017.
73
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 Email from Dominic Orr, Subject: Focal Reviews, June 25, 2014 (ArubaAA0054934). Galvin 
Dep. at 132 – 135. 
72
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73
 2014 10-K, p. 48. 
SBC Expense by Operating Expense Category 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
($ Millions)
Cost of Revenue 1$              3$            5$            7$            9$            
Research & Development 11              23            31            36            44            
Sales & Marketing 14              24            35            38            42            
General & Administrative 10              13            13            16            16            
Total Stock-Based Compensation 36$            64$          84$          96$          111$        
SBC Expense by Award Type
Stock Options 16$            19$          17$          10$          5$            
Stock Awards 16              39            59            77            97            
Employee Stock Purchase Plan 4                6              8              10            9              
36$            64$          84$          96$          111$        
SBC Expense Percentage of Revenue 13.5% 16.1% 16.2% 16.0% 15.3%
Source: Company filings with the SEC.
For the Fiscal Year Ended July 31




79. As of June 2014, Galvin had “started a three-year plan to get us to high single 
digits of SBC as a percentage of revenue.”
74
  Galvin testified that once Aruba achieved this goal 
there would be no reason for it to go back to its historical “double the market” SBC levels.
75
   
80. Aruba management also publicly announced their plans to both reduce SBC as a 
percent of revenue and to continue share repurchases to negate the impact of dilution caused by 
stock awards. Consider, for example, the following from the Company’s 2014 earnings calls with 
analysts: 
“Next, I would like to comment on our stock-based compensation, or SBC. As I 
have discussed in previous quarters, we have implemented changes over the past 
year in our stock issuance practices. Our goal is to both reduce our SBC as a 
percentage of revenue as well as to moderate our stock dilution. In fiscal years '12 
and '13, we had SBC of 16% of revenues in each year. In our last 2 fiscal quarters, 
we have begun to see the benefits of the changes in our issuance practices, 
reporting SBC as a percentage of revenue of 15% in Q3 and 13% in this Q4. 
These actions brought our full fiscal '14 SBC down to 15% of revenue. For fiscal 
2015, we expect to drive further shareholder return with SBC in the range of 12% 




“As we move forward, we plan to continue to utilize our repurchase program to 




 ARUBA’S CAPITAL STRUCTURE INITIATIVES D.
81. In the quarters leading up to the valuation date, Aruba focused on initiatives to 
optimize its capital structure.  As of the valuation date, Aruba had no debt – a capital structure 
that Galvin recognized might not have been optimal in the long term because he “had a view for 
our future that having a portion of [our] balance sheet and [our] capital structure in debt was 
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possibly a good thing if it’s an effective means of financing” and that as Aruba matured it was 
“more likely to have a more normalized capital structure.”
78
   
82. As early as June 2013, the Capital Structure Subcommittee of the Aruba Board 
(“Capital Structure Subcommittee”) held meetings to discuss capital structure alternatives and its 
stock repurchase program.
79
 The Capital Structure Subcommittee discussed financing options to 
improve the Company’s capital structure, including using a portion of the proceeds of a 
convertible debt offering to repurchase shares over and above the historic buyback program 
designed to offset the dilutive effect of the Company’s SBC. The Capital Structure 
Subcommittee used Barclays as its financial advisor for a potential convertible debt offering and 
alternated between Barclays and UBS for its stock repurchase plan in order to spread the 
business between the two banks.
80
 
1. Convertible Bond Offering 
83. At the June 21, 2013 meeting of the Capital Structure Subcommittee, Barclays 
presented financing discussion materials concerning a convertible bond offering.
81
 At its August 
8, 2013 meeting, also attended by Barclays, the subcommittee recommended that the Aruba 
Board approve a $300 million financing.
82
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84. In the summer of 2014, the Company was working with Barclays to launch the 
$300 million convertible bond offering after the Labor Day holiday. Prior to HP approaching 
Aruba with the idea of a merger, the convertible bond offering appeared to be on track as 
evidenced by the following June 16, 2014 email from Barclays to Galvin: 
“Kirk [Kaludis of Barclays] updated the team on your latest thinking, so please 
find attached a revised timeline preparing for a post Labor Day launch. 
* * * 
…as we head into the summer, the markets are in great shape. Convertible 
investors are hungry for paper and the equity/bond markets have resumed their 
upwards march after a rocky spring.”
83
 
85. As merger talks progressed with HP (as discussed in more detail below), the 
Company put the financing on hold. When Aruba informed Barclays that it was tabling the 
convertible bond offering, Barclays was perplexed by Aruba’s inaction, suggesting that the plans 
for the bond offering were very far along, as set forth in a September 25, 2014 email sent by 
Galvin to a number of Aruba executives: 
“Kirk [Kaludis] and I spoke yesterday. His head is spinning because all the stars 
have aligned to do a convert [convertible note financing], and yet we aren't. I told 
him that it just can’t happen this qtr, but we're still calibrating every 90 days when 
the time is right. He said ‘Mike, in my business, when this happens, either an exec 




86. The advanced stage of the bond offering plans is further reinforced by the below 
statement in Galvin’s email: 
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“Stu [Francis at Evercore] is not on to us nearly as much, because his angle has 
been just hoping to get some of the convert, but he doesn't know, like Kirk does, 
just how close we were to doing a financing.”
85
 
87. Had Aruba completed the convertible bond offering, not only would it have 
provided additional funds for the Company to buy back stock, but it also would have 
demonstrated to the market that Aruba was now capable of taking on fixed corporate obligations, 
something typically reserved for more established businesses. 
2. Stock Repurchase Program 
88. Aruba had a stock repurchase plan in place to offset the dilutive effects of SBC. 
On a regular basis, the Company bought back shares at prices that would be consistent with a 
belief that the stock was undervalued.  
89. In early January 2014, Warmenhoven sent an email regarding increasing stock 
repurchases.
86
 The following month, Galvin wrote a similar email in regards to increasing stock 
repurchases.
87  
At the February 14, 2014 Capital Structure Subcommittee meeting, the 
subcommittee discussed plans to increase the stock repurchase plan and stated: 
 “1. The recent trading price of the Company’s stock on the NASDAQ Global 
Select Market has been depressed and the Board believes that the trading price of 
the Company’s common stock may be undervalued and may present an attractive 
opportunity for investment in the Company’s funds; 
2. The Company has sufficient cash resources available to effect repurchases 
without significantly weakening the Company’s financial position or its ability to 
finance its operations; and 
                                                 
85
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3. The repurchase of shares will help counter the Company’s normal dilution from 
new share issuances for employee compensation.”
88 
 
90. Following this meeting, the Aruba Board issued a press release stating that it had 
approved an additional $200 million of stock repurchases.
89
 
91. After HP approached Aruba about a potential transaction (as discussed below), 
Aruba continued to buy back stock.  At the September 2, 2014 Aruba Board meeting, “[t]he 
Board determined to allow repurchases within the existing limits previously approved (no more 
than $25 million per quarter at prices no higher than $25.00/share) and consistent with past 
practice, given the highly preliminary nature of discussions with Helsinki [HP].”
90
  
92. On September 27, 2014, Galvin sent an email regarding share buybacks of $80 
million planned for Q2 2015 and related presentation to the Capital Structure Subcommittee.
91
  
93. Galvin testified that Aruba’s stock repurchase program had been in place since 
2012 and it was only stopped temporarily in light of the discussions with HP.
92
 Following the 
termination of merger talks in November 2014, Aruba management acted quickly to resume the 
                                                 
88
 Minutes of a Meeting of the Capital Structure Subcommittee of the Board of Directors of 
Aruba Networks, Inc., February 14, 2014, p. 2 (ArubaAA0002000). See also Galvin Dep. at 85 – 
89. 
89
 “Aruba Networks Announces Additional $200 Million Share Repurchase Authorization,” 
Aruba Networks, Inc. News Release, February 20, 2014 (http://news.arubanetworks.com/press-
release/aruba-networks-announces-additional-200-million-share-repurchase-authorization  
90
 Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Directors of Aruba Networks, Inc., September 2, 2014, 
p. 1 (ArubaAA0001780). See also Galvin Dep. at pp. 93 – 94. 
91
 Email from Mike Galvin to Emmanuel Hernandez, Mike Kourey and Dan Warmenhoven, 
November 27, 2014 and attached Capital Structure Committee, Stock Repurchase Update, 
November 26, 2014 (ArubaAA0538775 – 79). 
92
 Galvin Dep. at 96:10-25. 




buyback program, proposing that the Company repurchase up to $75 million ($25 million catch 
up and $50 million normal repurchase).
93
 
94. Security analysts also discussed with Aruba management that buying back stock 
at a time when the Company’s stock price was depressed was a good use of corporate resources. 
For example, Jason Ader, CFA of William Blair and Company, wrote: 
“…one obvious consideration for you guys at this stock price is why not pursue 
an accelerated buyback. I know you probably don't want to deplete your balance 
sheet but this seems like a perfect opportunity to issue a low-cost convert and use 
that cash to buy back a bunch of stock. You would be making a huge statement by 
doing this, putting your money where your mouth is, rewarding patient 
shareholders and driving significant earnings accretion while only taking on a 
very modest debt that would become equity at a more reasonable price.”
94
 
V. BACKGROUND OF THE MERGER 
95. In the following section of this report, I discuss the timetable and negotiations that 
led to the $24.67 deal price, the process Aruba and HP used to retain their financial advisors, and 
a summary of the key terms of the merger agreement. 
 PROCESS OF ARRIVING AT THE TRANSACTION PRICE A.
96. As early as July 2014, HP received approval to approach Aruba about a possible 
transaction; in late July or early August, Antonio Neri, Senior Vice President and General 
Manager, HP Servers and HP Networking Global Business Units (“Neri”), was scheduled to 
meet with Orr to discuss opportunities.
95
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97. On August 27, 2014, Orr received a call from Neri, who expressed HP’s interest 
in acquiring Aruba. Orr then notified Warmenhoven of his call with Neri.
96
  
98. Shortly thereafter, Aruba reached out to Qatalyst Partners (“Qatalyst”) about the 
potential transaction and quickly retained Qatalyst to represent it. Qatalyst’s retention is 
discussed in further detail below.  
99. On August 30, 2014, Qatalyst provided “talking points” for Orr to use in his 
upcoming call with Neri about the potential transaction. Qatalyst suggested the following points 
to be made regarding Aruba’s potential sale: 
 “…our investments…are starting to pay considerable dividends as our market 
share has increased from 12.7% to 15.2% and we have a clear path to additional 
market share gains over the next several quarters.” 
“…we have substantial upside ahead of us, and a high degree of confidence in our 
ability to execute and realize this upside. It also means that this is not a good time 
to be considering a sale of the company because the market does not fully 
appreciate the momentum we have which is not reflected in our share price, as 
investors tend to take a wait and see attitude.”
 
 
“…I would need to have a high degree of conviction that a combination with HP 




“…it is important you understand that we would only consider an acquisition 
offer, and take ourselves off the independent course we are on, if the price fully 
reflects both the significant upside we have in front of us as an independent 
company, and the strategic value of Aruba to HP or any other acquirer.”
 97
 
100. On August 30, 2014, Qatalyst partner George Boutros (“Boutros”) further advised 
Orr on how to position Aruba’s pricing expectations, suggesting that Orr state: 
“What all this means, is that for a deal to happen here, there will have to be a very 
substantial premium to market, well in excess of the typical m&a premium, in 
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order to fully reflect both the substantial upside potential we have as an 
independent company, and our strategic value to you and others.”
98
 
101. Following an Aruba Board meeting on September 10, 2014, Orr updated Neri on 
the meeting discussions. Neri summarized for the HP team his conversation with Orr as follows: 
“Dom Orr updated me this evening about his Board meeting. He held a 4 hours 
meeting where they discussed 2 topics. First a review of his 3 years plan 
presented 2 weeks ago to validate the assumptions to achieve it. Second the Aspen 
[Aruba] business case and request for engagement, [sic] 
Overall the Aspen Board is interested and intrigued. They would like to have a 
deeper conversation around how serious we are and our willingness to execute the 
plan/synergies. They requested to have their leading board member Dan 
Warmenhoven to have a conversation with Meg [Whitman] on this. Meg and Dan 
know each other, and I will organize Meg to place a call into Dan.”99 
102. In late September 2014 as Aruba management was preparing a presentation to be 
made to HP, Hahn reported on the following points that Orr wanted to make in telling its story to 
HP: 
“1. We are a high growth company with a diverse base of customers 
2. We are a high margin company and margins are only going to improve 
3. We are a highly profitable company 
4. And the momentum is just beginning 
5. We are on our way to $40 on our own 




103. From the outset, Aruba recognized that the best way to maximize value was to get 
competing bids.
101
  Qatalyst identified potential competitors to HP and identified six Tier I 
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strategic partners (EMC, Google, HP, Juniper Networks, Microsoft, and Oracle) and seven Tier 




104. While Qatalyst identified a number of potential bidders, it was understood from 
the outset that the chances of a competitive bid emerging were low. Boutros testified that in 
Qatalyst’s view even within Tier I “it wasn’t likely that there would be any other buyers other 
than HP,” but that Qatalyst would nonetheless reach out to certain of the potential bidders it had 
identified.
103
   
105. Similarly, Orr testified that Qatalyst informed Aruba that “this is going to be a 
tough assignment, because there was not really an obvious bidding partner” and that Qatalyst 
would “try [its] best, but coming up with a competitive bid [was] going to be difficult.”  Orr was 
not surprised by Qatalyst’s assessment that the prospect of a competing bidder emerging was 
low, testifying that “in my heart, [I] agreed because I had been scanning the scene repeatedly and 
constantly, and I know why that is the case.”
104
 
106. While Qatalyst and Aruba both recognized that the odds of a competing bid 
emerging were low, Qatalyst was instructed at the September 25, 2014 Board Meeting to contact 
a limited number of strategic partners.  Qatalyst was instructed to not contact any potential 
private equity bidders.  
                                                                                                                                                             
101
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107. Between September 29, 2014 and October 2, 2014, Qatalyst contacted five 
potential strategic partners.
105
 The outreach calls were brief, each involving Qatalyst 
communicating only that Aruba had been approached and asking whether the outreach target 
might be interested.  No financial information was provided.
 106
 
108. By October 9, 2014, each of the five had informed Qatalyst that it had no interest 




109. HP evidently shared Qatalyst’s/Orr’s view that it had no competition for its 
acquisition of Aruba.  In fact, HP Vice President of Corporate Development Joakim Johansson 
(“Johansson”), testified that he did not even think Aruba was running any kind of sales process at 
all: 
“A. …[F]rom the time that Antonio reached out to Dom, at least from our 
perspective, it was a very friendly discussion. It was -- they were not running a 
sales process. There was no posturing about trying to pin us against someone else.  
Q. Did anyone at Aruba ever tell HP about any other companies expressing an 




110. On October 2, 2014, Aruba and HP management had a face-to-face meeting to 
discuss the potential transaction.  Aruba presented its then-current financial forecasts to HP and 
provided other non-public information about the Company’s ongoing strategy and vision, its 
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product roadmap, its go-to-market strategy, its financials, and the potential synergies that may 
have resulted from a transaction.  
111. On October 5, 2014, Neri told Orr that the information provided during the 
October 2 meeting had only “increased HP’s interest in the potential transaction and that the 
product roadmap presented” “indicated greater synergies than HP’s prior assessment.”
109
 
112. On October 6, 2014, HP announced that it planned to split into two companies, 
HP management reached out to Aruba to reassure it that HP remained focused on the potential 
acquisition and that the announced separation would not derail the potential deal.
110
    
113. The parties continued to assess the potential transaction throughout October.  On 




114. In late October or early November 2014, Orr informed Johansson of Aruba’s 
preliminary financial results for the quarter ended October 31, 2014 (Q1 2015). Orr indicated to 
Johansson that Aruba would likely beat Wall Street estimates on revenue, gross margin, 
operating margin, and EPS.
112
 
115. On November 3, 2014, the parties met to discuss HP’s progress on reviewing the 
potential acquisition.  HP informed Aruba that it planned to bring the potential deal to its board 
at its November 19, 2014 meeting and that it expected to be able to make an offer after that 
meeting.   
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116. After the November 19, 2014 meeting, HP did not present an offer for Aruba. 
117. On November 21, 2014, as noted above, Aruba announced it 1Q 2015 results.  
The Company’s stock dropped 14% in response to Aruba’s lowering of guidance to 1% below 
the midpoint of analysts’ expectations.   
118. On November 24, 2014, Neri informed Orr that HP’s Board had asked HP 
management to prepare additional financial analysis concerning the potential acquisition and that 
HP would need an additional two to three weeks to address these questions.
113
 
119. On November 25, 2014, Orr called Neri to inform him that Aruba was ending 
discussions with HP regarding an acquisition. Orr reported to the Aruba Board as follows: 
 “After speaking with Antonio [Neri], I spoke with the members of my team in the 
tent (Keerti, Mike, Greg, Aaron, Ava) as well as with Qatalyst, WSGR and Dan 
Warmenhoven. We believe that it is time to terminate discussions. We have been 
in dialogue with Helsinki [HP] since August 27, and have not received a proposal 
in all this time. We have delayed making decisions in our business pending the 
Helsinki proposal. We cannot continue to wait for them. Though Helsinki 
indicated they need only a few more weeks, that has been their refrain since our 
October 2 management meeting. I called Antonio back today to break things 
off.”114 
120. According to Hahn, Johansson responded that its “board feels it needs to be ultra-
cautious” and that “the valuation ‘at your current stock price’ is hard to justify.”  In response to 
the discovery that HP thought that Aruba was “too expensive” at its then-current valuation, Orr 
responded, “Complete F&$king waste of our time!”
115
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121. In late December 2014, Neri called Orr and informed Orr that HP’s CEO, Meg 
Whitman (“Whitman”), had invited Orr to dinner. That dinner ultimately would take place on 
January 21, 2015. Although Neri did not state a purpose for the requested dinner meeting during 
his call, it was generally understood among the Aruba team that Whitman wanted to re-initiate a 
dialogue about a potential deal.
116
 
122. Between the time Neri called him and the date of the dinner, Orr did not do 
anything with respect to evaluating a potential deal.
117
  HP, however, continued to evaluate the 
potential transaction, bringing in McKinsey to analyze the synergies that HP could expect to 
realize through the transaction
118
 and reaching out to Barclays to serve as a financial advisor.
119
    
 HP MAKES AN OFFER FOR ARUBA WHEN THE STOCK IS TRADING AT B.
DEPRESSED LEVELS 
123. When HP first approached Aruba about a potential transaction on August 27, 
2014, Aruba’s stock was trading at $22.01.
120
   Negotiations continued throughout the fall, with 
HP never putting an offer on the table.  By the date of the January 21, 2015 dinner meeting 
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124. This stock price drop did not go unnoticed by Aruba’s Board. The day following 
the January 21, 2015 dinner meeting, Aruba Board member Bernard Guidon noted that “[t]he big 




125. On January 31, 2015, HP made its first offer for Aruba:  $23.25 per share in 
cash.
123
 The $23.25 per share offer represented a 7% premium to Aruba’s closing price of $21.80 
on November 20, 2014 (the last trading day before Aruba issued its Q2 2015 revenue guidance to 
the market after the close on November 20, 2014) and a 14.8% premium to Aruba’s closing price 
of $20.24 on August 26, 2014 (the day before HP first approached about a possible deal).  
126. Prior to receiving this offer, Qatalyst had not provided the Aruba Board with a 
DCF analysis of Aruba’s value.
124
  Further, Warmenhoven testified that even if “somebody did 
[perform a DCF], it didn’t make any difference, because nobody was going to look at it. It’s just 
not the basis for the valuation that we were interested in.”
125
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127. On February 4, 2015, the Aruba Board held a special meeting to evaluate HP’s 
$23.25 offer. The Aruba Board determined that a $29 counteroffer would be appropriate.  In 
presenting this counteroffer to Barclays, Aruba’s financial advisor Evercore Group L.L.C. 
(“Evercore”), the retention of which is discussed below, noted among other things: 
 Aspen’s internal plan is ahead of Street projections, so they feel confident in the 
growth prospects and opportunities of the company as a stand-alone business 
 The company had not been looking for a sale.  They mentioned that now is not an 
opportune time for a sale, given the stock is at a 52-week low. 
 The low stock price reflects a misperception in the market that Aspen will miss its 
quarter. In fact, Aspen will beat consensus and have good guide. 
 The “Board Authorized” message: “they are willing to engage on an exclusive 
basis, if the price is compelling” and that $29 per share is a price that’s actionable. 
 $23.25 is where the stock was a few months ago during the course of the early 
discussion between the companies.
126
 
128. On February 8, 2015, Barclays told Evercore that a proposal at approximately $24 
per share would be made.  While no letter of intent at this price was provided, Evercore 
responded that a higher price per share was warranted.
127
  
129. In setting its $24 per share offer, HP believed – based on publicly available 
information – that Aruba’s fully diluted shares outstanding count was 123.9 million.
128
  After 
receiving word of the potential $24 per share offer, Evercore provided revised share count 
information to Barclays that would allow HP to offer more per share without increasing the total 
price it believed it would be paying for Aruba at the time it made its offer for 123.9 million 
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shares at $24 per share.
129
  Because Aruba’s actual share count (119.4 million) was substantially 
lower that what HP was originally working off (123.9 million), HP would be able to increase its 
per share offer without actually offering to pay more money for the Company.
130
 Notably, in 
providing this information, Evercore suspected internally that HP was not willing to pay more 
than $3 billion for Aruba and that any offer it made would have to be structured to avoid crossing 
the $3 billion threshold.
131
 
130. On February 9, 2015, HP revised its offer to $24.67 per share in cash132 - a deal 
size of “$2.95 billion.”
133
  From HP’s perspective, this $24.67 offer was the mathematical 
equivalent of the $24 per share offer
134
 that Evercore was told would be coming in and that 
Evercore had told HP would be insufficient.
 135
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1. The Transaction Was Negotiated and Executed on a Compressed 
Schedule.   
132. HP exploited its previously announced plan to separate the company (discussed 
above) to place time constraints on the merger negotiations. 
133. In a set of proposed talking points, it was suggested that HP tell Aruba that the 
planned split was putting timing pressures on HP: 
Time is of the essence: (i) to achieve our goal of a November 1, 2015 separation, 
there are a number of things that must precede the separation with many deadlines 
fast approaching, including our ability to make changes to IT, HR, accounting and 
other functions; (ii) if we don’t seize the opportunity now, there are many external 




134. HP told Aruba that “we either do this now or the opportunity may not come 
back.”
138
    
135. HP’s banker at Barclays, Richard Hardegree (“Hardegree”), acknowledged that 
creating a timing pressure like this is “a fairly common negotiating tactic.”
139
 
136. Rather than push back against HP’s time pressure, the Aruba negotiating team 
proceeded on HP’s accelerated time schedule and determined that they wanted to announce a 
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deal before its upcoming Q2 2015 earnings call
140
and in advance of a major customer event 
called “Atmosphere” that was scheduled to take place on March 1, 2015.
141
  
137. Galvin noted that because both HP and Aruba were going to be announcing their 
earnings results in the third week of February, announcing a transaction “on the day of [Aruba’s] 
earnings release” would have been “the perfect time to do it.”
142
  While Aruba’s desire to 
announce a deal together with its earnings announcement might have made sense from a 
logistical standpoint, it created an odd dynamic in which Aruba would be negotiating a price at a 
time at which it believed its stock was trading low based on a misperception in the market that 
the Company would miss its quarter.
143
   
138. Aruba was well-aware that a positive earnings announcement could have a 
substantial impact on its trading price. In fact, within days of receiving HP’s first offer, Aruba 
witnessed this dynamic at work. On February 5, 2015 Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. (“Ubiquiti”) 
announced financial results for the quarter ended December 31, 2014 that exceeded security 
                                                 
140
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analysts’ consensus estimates for both revenue and earnings per share.
144
 Ubiquiti’s stock rose 
14% on the news.
145
  In fact, Aruba’s banker at Evercore, Stuart Francis (“Francis”), who was 
designated as the “lead negotiator,” told his negotiating adversary at Barclays that Aruba wanted 
to announce a deal “at or before the Aspen [Aruba] earnings announcement” because “[t]hey are 
afraid stock runs like Ubiquiti’s did which could make the deal more challenging from the Aspen 
[Aruba] perspective.”
146
 Such negotiating strategy evidences a focus more on getting a deal 
completed than necessarily maximizing price.  
139. On February 25, 2015, the day before Aruba’s scheduled earnings call, 
Bloomberg Business published an article reporting that Aruba and HP were discussing a 
potential acquisition of the Company. No potential prices were mentioned in the article. 
Following the release of the Bloomberg Business article, the trading price of Aruba stock rose 
21%. In commenting on this rumored acquisition, Citi Research (a division of Citigroup Global 
Markets Inc.) wrote: 
“Despite reports on Wednesday afternoon that HP is looking to acquire Aruba, we 
believe a deal is unlikely to happen, because: (a) we do not believe Aruba is a 
willing seller at prices near the current trading level… 
* * * 
While Aruba’s valuation has compressed recently, we believe CEO Orr would be 
unwilling to sell Aruba for less than $30/share (implying a 22.1x earnings 
multiple off our CY16 $1.36 PF EPS estimate, in-line with the average earnings 
                                                 
144
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multiple over the past two years), and would be unlikely to stay at HP for very 
long after adding integration risks for HP.”
147
 
140. On March 1, 2015, at a special meeting, the Aruba Board approved the 
transaction. 
141. On March 2, 2015, prior to the open of the market, Aruba and HP issued a joint 
press release announcing the transaction.
148
 
142. One security analyst expressed disappointment in the merger announcement. 
Cowen and Company, which followed the Company, wrote in a report titled “ARUN Sells Out: 
Investors Poorly Served”: 
 “We see ARUN’s agreement to be acquired by HPQ for $3 bln, or $24.67 per 
share, as a disappointing outcome for ARUN’s shareholders…we thought that 
ARUN would and should fetch $25 – 35 per share in an acquisition…today, we 
can only say that this is a very disappointing outcome.” 
“ARUN appears essentially to have thrown in the towel. Its commentary suggests 
it simply had grown tired of the ‘discount’ in its shares. And lacked confidence 
that it could meaningfully positively influence investor sentiment.  And, as 
previously noted, the decision to exit for what appears to us to be essentially no 




 THE FINANCIAL ADVISORS RETAINED BY ARUBA AND HP OPERATED UNDER C.
POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
143. As noted above, Aruba initially retained Qatalyst to serve as its banker for the 
potential HP transaction. Evercore was subsequently retained as a second financial advisor.  The 
unusual circumstances surrounding the retention of Qatalyst and the subsequent retention of a 
                                                 
147
 “ARUN FQ2 Wrap: Strong Fed and Services Gross Margin Drive Beats on both the Top and 
Bottom Lines: Remain Neutral,” Citi Research, February 27, 2015, pp. 3 -4 (QP00008417-8418). 
148
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second financial advisor bear exploring, as these circumstances had the potential to impact the 
negotiations. 
1. Qatalyst Partners 
144. Aruba reached out to Qatalyst about a potential retention immediately upon being 
approached by HP.  Aruba retained Qatalyst without reaching out to any other financial 
advisors
150
 due to (1) longstanding relationships between Aruba and Qatalyst
151
 and (2) 
Qatalyst’s reputation as the “go to” banker to drum up competing bids.
152 
 
145. Aruba officially retained Qatalyst on September 5, 2014.153 The Qatalyst team 
working on behalf of Aruba was led by Qatalyst CEO, Frank Quattrone (“Quattrone”), Boutros, 
and Nadir Shaikh.
154
 As compensation for its services, Qatalyst would receive a Financial 
Advisory Fee of $100,000 upon the signing of the engagement agreement and a $5.0 million 
Opinion Fee for the issuance of an opinion related to a Transaction (as defined in the agreement). 
Should a Transaction close, Qatalyst would receive 1.0% of the value to which the Financial 
                                                 
150
 Warmenhoven Dep. at 59:23-60:2 (Warmenhoven not aware of Orr or anyone else reaching 
out to any banks but Qatalyst); Orr Dep. at  124:5-130:5.   
151
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154
 Project Athens, Materials for Discussion, September 2014, p. 2 (ARUN000002). 




Advisory Fee and Opinion Fee would be credited.
155
  The bulk of Qatalyst’s fee, therefore, 
depended on a transaction closing – a fact that Orr noted gave rise to a “subtle but important split 
in objectives between Qatalyst and Aruba” because Q “only have one objective in mind – sell 
Aruba at the highest premium but sell it!”
156
 
146. In addition to the conflict created by the economic incentive to favor any deal 
over no deal, Qatalyst faced additional constraints unique to HP specifically. In 2011, Qatalyst 
served as the financial advisor to Autonomy Corporation, plc (“Autonomy”), in a transaction in 
which HP bought Autonomy for $11.1 billion. That deal was largely seen as a debacle for HP, 
which in November 2012 recorded an $8.8 billion non-cash charge for impairment of goodwill 
and intangible assets primarily related to the Autonomy acquisition.
157
 HP’s acquisition of 
Autonomy resulted in significant litigation, which was pending throughout the time that HP was 
pursuing its acquisition of Aruba, in which HP’s shareholders sued HP over its acquisition of 
Autonomy.
158
  In March 2015, HP sued Autonomy executives accusing them of presenting 
fraudulent financials and lying about that company’s operations.
159
 
147. Qatalyst’s prior representation of Autonomy in the controversial sale gave rise to 
unique issues in connection with Qatalyst’s representation of Aruba here. Aruba was aware from 
the outset that HP might have an issue with Qatalyst serving as Aruba’s financial advisor due to 
                                                 
155
 Engagement Agreement between Aruba Networks, Inc. and Qatalyst Partners, September 5, 
2014, p. 2 (QP00013598). 
156
 Email from Dominic Orr to Ava Hahn, Subject Re: One Page Summary, September 25, 2014 
(ARUN001504). 
157
 Hewlett-Packard Company, Form 8-K, November 20, 2012, p. 3.   
158
 “HP pay $100 million to settle Autonomy-related class-action suit,” Reuters, June 9, 2015. 
159
 “HP sues Autonomy founder Mike Lynch as battle heats up,” Financial Times, March 31, 
2015. 




Qatalyst’s involvement in the Autonomy transaction. In a September 22, 2014 email from Aruba 
Vice President of Human Resources Aaron Bean (“Bean”) sent to Orr and other Aruba 
executives, Bean stated: 
“one thing we should talk through is when Dom [Orr] meets with A [Antonio Neri 
of HP] and tells him yes we will use bankers if A replies as long as it isn’t Q 
[Qatalyst Partners] that is fine, or if we get to the point where we have to put Q’s 
name out there and if they say the[y] refuse to work with them we’ll need to have 
our response thought out a bit.”
160
 
148. Further, in a January 2015 email, Orr noted that the potential that HP would have 
a problem with Qatalyst being involved in the deal “was the first question I and Dan 
[Warmenhoven] asked them in the first call before appointment and Frank [Quattrone] assured 
us there would be no problem.”
161
 
149. But it was a problem. Shortly before the January 21, 2015, dinner meeting at 
Whitman’s home, the United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office had announced that it had closed its 
investigation into the Autonomy acquisition, finding that there was “insufficient evidence of a 
realistic prospect of conviction” of any Autonomy executives.
162
 Whitman discussed the 
Autonomy acquisition during the dinner meeting, and her comments made clear that she would 
not permit HP to engage in any transaction in which Qatalyst was involved. As Orr explained in 
an email to Warmenhoven sent immediately after that meeting:   
                                                 
160
 Email from Aaron Bean to Dominic Orr et al., Subject: News Observations, September 22, 
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161
 Email from Dominic Orr to Galvin (cc: Ava Hahn), Subject: Re: Aruba, January 24, 2015 
(ARUN001946). 
162
 See, e.g., Murad Ahmed, Serious Fraud Office closes Autonomy investigation (The Financial 
Times, January 19, 2015). 




 “Meg spoke with conviction and emotion over dinner that they were guilty.  The 
way Meg emoted about this issue  - I think if we don’t insert buffer person, our 
negotiation will suffer severely ..Thanks”
163
 
150. Thereafter, Aruba promptly set about finding a new advisor that would not 
displease Whitman.  On January 23, 2015, Warmenhoven sent an email to the members of the 
Aruba Board, alerting them to HP’s problem with Aruba using Qatalyst as its financial advisor: 
“We do have a bit of an issue and that is our choice of advisors. Helsinki [HP] is 
very anti Q [Qatalyst Partners]. At this time Meg is not aware that we have 
already signed on Q as our advisors. 
* * * 
Given that alarm, I have scheduled a call with Meg at 6:00 PM this evening 
to get her view of the status of the discussions and to discuss our 
representation. I intend to inform her that we signed up with Q many months 
ago. We are clearly bound by the contract with Q and will have to pay the 1 % fee 
if the transaction is concluded. But if Dom is correct then we may need to bring 
in a second advisor. I intend to float Stu Francis’ name past Meg. Stu has left 
Barclay’s and is now at Evercore. He is new, and Evercore is new in the tech 
sector, so they may be willing to do a deal at 1/4% just to get a deal done that they 
can brag about publicly.”
164
 
151. Following his telephone call with Whitman, Warmenhoven provided an update by 
reporting: 
“I spoke with Meg for 10 min just now. Quatalyst [sic], Frank [Quattrone] & 
George [Boutros] are not welcome in the negotiations. The issue is bigger than 
Autonomy and goes back to EBay & Yahoo. Meg described George as ‘evil’. 
She would be happy with either Stu [Francis] or me as negotiator with 
Quatalyst [sic] in the back room.”
165
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152. Aruba agreed to relegate Qatalyst to the back room and brought in a second 
banker (Francis of Evercore) to lead the negotiations.
166
   
153. That Whitman’s negative opinion of Qatalyst was the driving force behind 
Aruba’s decision to bring in a second banker is made clear in contemporaneous email exchanges. 
In an email dated January 22, 2015 discussing the impact bringing in a second advisor would 
have on fees, Orr wrote to Warmenhoven “Please put in the back of Meg’s mind we have 
retained Q [Qatalyst] for a while, we listened to her now switch the banker on negotiation 
part, but I don’t want her to get upset if due diligence people found we had contract with Q.”
167
 
154. As discussed below, Aruba ultimately retained Francis of Evercore as a second 
financial advisor to negotiate the terms of the merger while Qatalyst would continue to advise 
Aruba behind the scenes. However, even this diminished role for Qatalyst was problematic for 
Whitman.  On the evening of February 27, 2015, Neri and Orr met for dinner.  During their 
meeting, Neri stated that ‘“Meg [Whitman] freaked out when she, for the first time, saw the 
Qatalyst name on the docs as she thought we [Aruba] had switched out with stu [Francis of 
Evercore].”’ 
168
 Further, as the transaction was about to be announced on March 2, 2015, 
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155. For its part, Qatalyst recognized the significant role that HP held in the 
technology sector, and that maintaining a positive relationship with HP was important to 
Qatalyst’s ongoing business.  From the inception of its engagement with Aruba, Qatalyst 
identified HP as the only likely bidder for HP.
170
  In fact, in a September 22, 2014 email to Orr 
and other Aruba executives, Bean expressed his “thesis that Q[atalyst] is trying to make sure we 
get this done with H[P] and not look at other options.”
171
   
156. Whitman’s refusal to permit HP to negotiate with Qatalyst, therefore, presented 
challenges to Qatalyst’s business, and Quattrone quickly reached out to Whitman in an attempt 
to address her concerns. In a January 25, 2015 email, Quattrone pleaded his case to Whitman to 
maintain his firm’s role as financial advisor to Aruba: 
“I was very surprised and disappointed to learn from Dan Warmenhoven today 
that you recently expressed very strong negative feelings about our firm, some of 
our people (including me) and our current representation of Aruba. I would 
greatly appreciate the opportunity to speak or meet with you at your earliest 
convenience to understand from you directly what your concerns are and give me 
the opportunity to address them. We have a very close relationship with Dom, 
Dan and the board and have been contractually retained for some time now, and 
while our loyalties are always to our client on any assignment, I am confident we 




157. Keeping a role in the HP/Aruba transaction was important to Qatalyst from a 
market perspective. In summarizing  his conversation with Quattrone on January 25, 2016, 
Warmenhoven wrote to Orr and others: 
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“The net is that he [Quattrone] wants an opportunity to speak with Meg as the 
next step. He was not willing to discuss fees, etc. 
The issue is not Aruba. It is about the Quatalyst [sic] brand (as Dom 
described). If word spreads that they were tossed from this deal because HP 
will not engage with them on any M&A transaction, that creates a big issue 
for them. Plus the fees will be public (as Stu mentioned) and the fact we have 2 
advisors will raise all kinds of questions for them in future engagements. 
Frank wants to save his firm, so I agreed to try to brokered [sic] a discussion 
between him and Meg. 
My opinion is that at this point Aruba is a transaction for Frank. The 




158. On January 24, 2015, Orr spoke to Boutros and as Orr detailed to Warmenhoven, 
upon learning of his firm’s “firing,” Boutros was “so emotional, defensive AND offensive (to 
Meg) that he hardly let me talk.”
174 
Interestingly, Orr also noted his beliefs as to why Boutros 
reactively so strongly to this news, none of which reflected on what was in Aruba’s best interest: 
“I think George reacted so strongly cause (1) pride of their brand (2) reaction to 
Stu coming in the picture (3) protecting their fees. 
None of the above related to the benefits of aruba !”
175
 
159. In fact, Quattrone continued his efforts to rehabilitate Qatalyst’s relationship with 
Whitman after the merger agreement was signed. On March 1, 2015, the day the deal was 
announced, Quattrone sent an email to Whitman expressing his desire to have a good 
relationship with HP and his willingness to explore alternatives to Qatalyst’s ordinary course of 
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marketing the firm’s involvement in the deal.
176
 In this email, Quattrone noted that he would 
agree not to send out a customary marketing blast publicizing his firm’s role in the deal “if by 
doing so, we will have a ‘clean slate’ with you and HP immediately going forward.  Just to be 
clear, this would require a commitment by you and your team that you will not: 1) disparage our 
firm or any of our partners; 2) attempt to persuade any of our clients not to use or services; and 
3) tell our clients or prospective clients that you won’t acquire them (or that it would make things 
more difficult for you to acquire them) if we are their advisors, among other things.”
177
 
160. In June 2015, Quattrone reached out to Whitman to set up a meeting “in order to 
discuss the path forward” between Qatalyst and HP.
178
 
161. In September 2015, Quattrone reached out to Whitman to give her the chance to 
“object to any of the draft answers” it proposed to give to a Wall Street Journal reporter who was 




162. Whitman’s power over Qatalyst as evidenced by her ability to convince Aruba to 
relegate its chosen banker to the back room combined with Qatalyst’s desire to return to her good 
graces in the wake of Autonomy create reason to doubt whether Qatalyst was operating free from 
any extraneous considerations in advising Aruba about the potential transaction. 
                                                 
176
 Email from Frank Quattrone to Meg Whitman, March 1, 2015 (ArubaAA0350502-503). 
177
 QP00011440-443 (Boutros Ex. 40). 
178
 ArubaAA0350501-0503 (Boutros Ex. 42). 
179
 ArubaAA0432268-2270 (Boutros Ex. 43). 




2. Evercore Group L.L.C. 
163. Following Whitman’s reaction to learning of Aruba’s retention of Qatalyst, Aruba 
set about retaining a second banker that Whitman would be willing to negotiate against. Aruba 
quickly focused on Francis of Evercore as the second banker. 
164. In addition to acceding to Whitman’s unwillingness to work with Qatalyst by 
bringing in a second advisor, Aruba sought Whitman’s opinion of who the second banker should 
be. As Warmenhoven wrote to Orr upon learning of Whitman’s potential problem with Qatalyst: 
“Got it. I have a strategy. HP uses all firms, especially now before the break up. 
But Stu [Francis] is in a new firm [Evercore] and not conflicted, and Meg knows 
and (I think) trusts him.  




165. Warmenhoven (as noted above) also informed Aruba’s Board that he planned to 
“float Stu Francis’s name past Meg.”
181
  
166. Beyond “floating” Stu Francis’ name by Whitman, contemporaneous documents 
suggest that she may have been given a veto power over the second banker that Aruba was 
bringing in to address her unwillingness to work with the banker Aruba had initially chosen.  In a 
January 23, 2015 email, Orr noted to Hahn that she and Galvin “also need to manage the update 
to Q and appointment of Stu if M[eg Whitman] and our board agree.”
182
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167. Evercore, like Qatalyst, suffered from potential conflicts of interest that may have 
impacted its role in negotiating against HP.  As Warmenhoven noted at the outset of the 
consideration of hiring Francis, “Stu has left Barclay’s and is now at Evercore. He is new, and 
Evercore is new in the tech sector, so they may be willing to do a deal at 1/4% just to get a deal 
done that they can brag about publicly.”
 183
 
168. Hahn also noted Evercore’s desire to secure a role in the transaction to advance its 
presence in the technology sector in a January 24, 2015 email: 
“Stu’s in. He's happy to be invited to participate and understands he is not going 
to get 1% like Q did. He will be rational. He started at Evercore 5 months ago 




169. Aruba’s speculation that Evercore’s desire to be part of the deal was motivated, at 
least in part, by its desire to grow its presence in the tech sector appears to be well-founded, 
based on contemporaneous emails among high-ranking Evercore bankers at the time it secured 
the deal. Francis noted that he was “pretty excited” about the deal “in terms of our valley 
profile.”185  Ralph Schlosstein, the CEO of Evercore, stated, “This is just an amazing piece of 
good news, which could have important implications for out positioning in the industry.”
186 
Senior Managing Director Naveen Nataraj described the news as “Truly amazing!” and the deal 
as a “franchise transaction,”
187 
and Senior Managing Director Michael Price stated “This is 
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franchise defining.”188 Roger Altman, Founder and Executive Chairman of Evercore commented, 
“Just remarkable, Stu. What a coup! Would be, as you say, a dynamic advance for Evercore in 
The Valley.”
189
 These contemporaneous statements make clear that Evercore viewed the 
potential HP/Aruba transaction as a stepping stone to help Evercore’s business. 
170. In addition to shoring up Evercore’s presence in the tech sector, securing a role in 
the HP/Aruba transaction gave Evercore a chance to build a relationship with Whitman that 
could lead to further work down the road.   This is evident in an email exchange between 
Evercore Senior Managing Director Naveen Nataraj and Francis following a negotiating dinner 
meeting at Whitman’s house on February 20, 2015. Francis reported that “people on our side 
said we had done a ‘masterful’ job of taking Meg through the issues as if we were her advisor … 
let’s hope that that can help us get some traction in the future with her …”
190
  Nataraj responded 
to Francis’ email by stating “That’s HUGE! Meg is going to be very active. Am almost sure 




171. The terms on which Evercore agreed to be retained further underscore the 
importance of this retention to the bank from a strategic standpoint.   At the outset of 
negotiations over a fee split with Qatalyst, Evercore indicated that a 75/25 split would be a 
                                                 
188
 Email from Michael Price to Stuart Francis, Subject Re: Very Confidential, potentially very 
good news, January 24, 2015 (Evercore00000543) (Reisenberg Ex. 6). 
189
 Email from Roger Altman to Stuart Francis, Subject: Re: Very Confidential, potentially good 
news, January 24, 2015 (EVERCORE00000545) (Reisenberg Ex. 8). 
190
 EVERCORE00007343 (Reisenberg Ex. 39). 
191
 Email from Naveen Nataraj to Stuart Francis, Subject: Re: Evercore meeting at MWC/CEO 
Dinner at Can Roca, February 21, 2015 (EVERCORE00007343) (Reisenberg Ex. 39). 




“harmful precedent to set.”
192
  Evercore, nonetheless, agreed to take 0.25% of the total 1.25% 
success fee being awarded to both bankers
193
 – an 80/20 split in Qatalyst’s favor.
194
 
172. The importance to Evercore of securing a role in the Aruba/HP deal both in terms 
of solidifying the bank’s presence in the tech sector and in terms of allowing it to build a 
potentially lucrative future relationship with HP  create reason to doubt whether Evercore was 
operating free from any extraneous considerations in negotiating the potential transaction with 
HP. 
3. Barclays Capital Inc. 
173. HP’s chosen banker, Barclays, similarly suffered from a potential conflict of 
interest.  As an initial matter, as discussed above, throughout 2014 Barclays was working with 
Aruba in connection with preparations for issuing the convertible bond.  As a result, Barclays 




174. Documents and deposition testimony in the record show that Barclays suspected 
in the fall of 2014 that Aruba was in talks to be acquired by HP
196
and began to reach out to its 
contacts at both companies to try to secure a role on either side of the deal.  
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175. Acting on these suspicions, as Orr described it, in a “blunt” and “threatening” 
manner, Barclays banker Kirk Kaludis (“Kaludis”) reached out to Orr in late September 2014 to 
try to get a role in the potential transaction: 
“we have done a lot if [sic] work to support you in the last 8 years, btw, it was all 
my work, not Stu’s, so I am calling to let you know that we would be 
disappointed if the HP rumor is true and you do not work with us!”
197
 
176. After Barclays failed to secure a role representing Aruba, it set about seeing if it 
could get work on the HP side of the deal.  On December 9, 2014, Laurence Goldberg called 
Tood Morgenfeld at HP to see if there was “anything [Barclays] could do to help” HP “fine-tune 
its portfolio in advance of the spin.”
198
  While the purpose of this call might not have been 
exclusively to try to get in on the Aruba/HP transaction, Hardegree acknowledged during his 
deposition that “Laurence was certainly aware that that was something that we had reason to 
speculate was under consideration at HP, and so [he thought] it was probably clearly on the list 
of probably numerous topics that were being discussed” during this December 9, 2014 phone 
call.
199
  Kaludis also reached out to Aruba during this timeframe, setting up a telephone call with 
Galvin for December 11, 2014.
200
 
177. Further demonstrating that Barclays was trying to get a retention on whatever side 
of the deal it could, Kaludis noted in a December 12, 2014 email to Hardegree, “I am trying to 
get back in front of the Aruba team.  Seems like we have given up on the HP side.”
201
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178. Barclays’ attempt to get retained by either Aruba or HP suggests that Barclays 
was indifferent to which side it represented in an attempt to obtain a fee. 
179. Furthermore, Francis had recently joined Evercore following a lengthy tenure at 
Barclays. Francis personally supervised the Barclays bankers that he would be negotiating 
against with respect to the potential Aruba/HP deal.
202
  In fact, Francis’ actual (or perceived) 
influence over his negotiating adversary was considered so important to Aruba that it tried to 
have a “key man” clause inserted in its retainer with Evercore.
203
    
180. These facts suggest that Barclays may be been influenced by outside forces in 
negotiating a deal with Aruba. 
181. In short, the conflicting interests of the bankers on both sides of the deal in getting 
a deal – any deal, on any terms – done may have created an incentive to favor the Aruba/HP deal 
over the option of advising Aruba to continue to execute on its standalone plan, even if this were 
the better outcome for Aruba’s stockholders.   
 DOMINIC ORR DISCUSSED HIS ROLE IN THE POST-CLOSING COMPANY WHEN D.
HE WAS PROHIBITED FROM DOING SO UNDER A CONFIDENTIALITY 
AGREEMENT 
182. In addition to the bankers on both sides having potential conflicts of interest, Orr 
similarly had conflicting incentives, as he knew from the outset of the negotiations that he was 
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but they will not budge, given the unique nature of the dialogue I can have in [sic] their behalf  
with my former colleagues.”). 




expected to run the post-closing Aruba and had discussions about this post-closing role at times 
when he was prohibited from doing so by a confidentiality agreement.  
183. On October 2, 2014, Aruba and HP signed a Mutual Confidentiality Agreement 
(“MCA”) that addressed the exchange of confidential information. The MCA precluded HP from 
having any direct or indirect informal discussions with any director, officer, or other employee of 
Aruba relating to retention, severance, or other compensation in connection with a possible 
transaction.
204
 Specifically, the MCA stated: 
“HP hereby agrees that, except to the extent expressly authorized by the board of 
directors of the Company (or any authorized committee thereof) in advance, 
neither HP nor any of its Representatives acting on its behalf will directly or 
indirectly have any formal or informal discussions, or directly or indirectly enter 
into any agreement, arrangement or understanding (whether or not binding), with 
any director, officer or other employee of the Company relating to (i) any 
retention, severance or other compensation, incentives or benefits that may be or 
become payable to any directors, officers or employees of the Company in 
connection with a Transaction or following the consummation thereof, or (ii) any 
directorship, employment, consulting arrangement or other similar association or 
involvement of any directors, officers or other employees of the Company with 




184. Prior to the signing of the MCA, it was made known to Orr that he was expected 
to run the combined business if a transaction was consummated. For example, as early as 
September 24, 2014 Orr stated in an email to several Aruba employees that HP personnel Tom 
Black and Dominic Wilde would be working for Aruba personnel (or at least Orr himself).
206
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185. After the MCA was signed, Orr understood that he was prohibited from having 
any talks about his potential post-closing employment with HP.
207
 
186. Despite this prohibition, Orr had unauthorized discussions with HP concerning his 
role with HP post-merger. For example, in a November 4, 2014 email Orr sent to Qatalyst and 
Aruba personnel after a meeting he had with Johansson, Orr wrote: 
“I met with Joakim over drinks for 75 minutes. He wanted to meet me for three 
things: 
 (1) let me know clearly that, post combination, they expect me to run the 
 whole networking business. He wants to look me in the eye and see that I 
 have no objection. I told him I have no objection.”
208
 
187. In a February 2, 2015 email, Orr notes that he had gone over his “notes from the 
conversation with Joakim, in which [Orr] tried to extract [Joakim’s] observation in the 
[November 19, 2015] Helsinki board meeting.” Orr noted that during this conversation he had 
asked Joakim “for the salient points to justify the case” and that Joakim listed “dom to run 
combined biz” among them.
209
   
188. Orr’s contemplated role leading the post-closing Aruba suggests that he may have 
had divided loyalties in negotiating the deal.   
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189. It was not until February 18, 2015 that the Aruba Board agreed to amend the 
MCA to remove the provision prohibiting discussions regarding employee solicitations.  
 ABSENCE OF A GO-SHOP PROVISION210 E.
190. On March 2, 2015, HP and Aruba entered into the Agreement and Plan of Merger 
(“Merger Agreement”). Under the terms of the Merger Agreement, Aruba shareholders were 
entitled to receive $24.67 per share in cash.  
191. The Merger Agreement did not include a “go-shop” but, rather, prohibited Aruba 
from soliciting a competing offer.   While the absence of a go-shop might not be troubling in 
certain circumstances, it is important to remember that Aruba never went through a formal sales 
process because it was not affirmatively for sale.  The only efforts made to “shop” the Company 
were Qatalyst’s limited contacts (as described above) with five potential strategic partners in late 
September and early October and its subsequent reach out to Citrix in January 2015.  Under 
these circumstances, the absence of a go-shop is problematic.   
VI. VALUATION OF ARUBA NETWORKS, INC. COMMON STOCK 
 INDUSTRY OUTLOOK211 A.
192. Broadly speaking, Aruba operates in the enterprise network equipment industry. 
Companies in this space provide their customers with the hardware and software necessary to 
build a secure communications network for all the computers and devices used in operating their 
business. This network enables a business to share data and computer resources between all 
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company locations. For example, corporate offices in San Diego can easily share data and 
resources with production facilities in Mexico. Specifically, enterprise network equipment 
includes products such as routers, Ethernet switches, WAN optimization equipment, WLAN 
equipment, and application delivery controllers.  
193. Over the period 2011-2014, industry revenues (as defined by IDC) grew from 
$38.7 billion to approximately $40.2 billion for a compound annual growth rate of 1.3%. These 
revenues were globally diversified, with 46.2% of revenues coming from North and South 
America, 29.0% from Europe and the Middle East, and the remaining 24.8% coming from the 
Asia/Pacific region. This geographical mix was projected to continue through 2019, with revenue 
from Asia/Pacific growing slightly faster than other regions. 
194. The industry was further segmented into traditional (or wired) networking 
equipment and wireless network equipment. The traditional networking segment was led by 
companies such as Cisco Systems and Juniper Networks. Traditionally, these companies 
provided products, software, and support services for wired network solutions with products 
including, but not limited to, switches and routers. Historically, the sale of these products 
accounted for the majority of industry revenue. For example, in 2014 the industry had revenues 
of more than $40 billion, with switch revenue accounting for approximately 53.3% of the total 
and router sales accounting for an additional 8.5%. It was projected that traditional networking 
equipment would continue to constitute the majority of industry revenue through at least 2019. 
195. WLAN equipment provides network capabilities similar to traditional networks, 
but with a focus on supporting secure wireless connections. WLAN allows a user to connect with 
a wireless device (e.g., laptop computer, smart phone, or tablet) via a signal that is transmitted 




through radio frequency waves, allowing users to move throughout the coverage area while 
maintaining a connection to the network.  
196. With more and more business conducted using a wireless device, the WLAN 
equipment segment has grown rapidly. Over the period 2011-2014, revenues for this segment 
grew at a compound annual rate of 17.6%, compared to 2.2% annual growth for the traditional 
segment. The wireless segment, however, was still relatively small compared to the wired 
segment. In 2014, this segment had revenues of $3.4 billion. 
197. The growth in WLAN equipment was driven by the evolution in WLAN 
technology, which was necessary to accommodate the growing popularity of wireless devices. In 
the early 1990’s, WLAN solutions were prohibitively expensive and were only used if a wired 
network was strategically or economically impossible. As the technology improved, WLAN 
adoption increased. The advent of IEEE 802.11 wireless protocols in 1997 provided an industry 
standard, replacing most WLAN solutions in existence at the time. These standards have been 
continuously developed, enabling companies to produce faster and more secure WLAN 
solutions. 
198. In 2014, the IEEE approved the newest 802.11 standard, 802.11ac. Maximum 
speeds with this standard were three times greater than the previous standard, 802.11n, and 
enterprises responded with quick adoption. Consider the following from a January 2015 industry 
research report: 
“The 802.11ac standard for WLAN is well on its way to being the fastest-adopted 
WLAN standard in history. Initially expected to overtake 802.11n in terms of 
enterprise shipments and revenue in 2016, recent quarterly trends are showing that 




the actual inflection point will likely come in 1H15 for revenue and follow shortly 
thereafter for shipments.”
 212 
199. The IDC forecasted that, after a tenfold increase in 802.11ac equipment revenue 
from 2013 to 2014, revenue would continue to grow at an annual rate of nearly 47% through 
2018. Furthermore, WLAN providers were planning to introduce “Wave 2” of 802.11ac 
solutions in 2015. Wave 2 promised even greater speeds and functionality and was expected to 
accelerate the move away from 802.11n. In fact, the IDC expected 802.11n to become obsolete 
by 2018. The following diagram illustrates the projected inflection point where 802.11ac 
overtakes its predecessor 802.11n: 
 
200. Given the fast adoption of 802.11ac and the launch of Wave 2, the wireless 
network equipment segment was expected to continue its rapid growth. Over the period 2014-
                                                 
212
 “Worldwide Enterprise Communications and Datacenter Network Infrastructure 2015 Top 10 
Predictions,” IDC, January 2015, p. 16 (ArubaAA0349480). 




2019 revenues were projected to grow at a compound annual rate of 9.6%, increasing this 
segment’s revenues to almost $7.8 billion. Comparatively, traditional network equipment was 
projected to grow at a more modest 3.0%.  Security analysts generally agreed with this 
sentiment. For example, in a February 21, 2014 report, Jefferies stated, “In our view, this is still a 
growth industry that’s in the relatively early-to-middle innings.”
213
 
201. Research analysts at Barclays also felt that 802.11ac adoption would be a big 
driver of growth in the industry. Consider the following from their U.S. Data Networking 
industry report from July of 2014: 
“We believe demand for wireless equipment continues to benefit from secular 
tailwinds, making it more resilient than other areas of networking…Perhaps the 
biggest driver through 2014 is the transition to the faster .11ac standard as 




202. However, Barclays saw increasing competition in the Wi-Fi vendor landscape. 




203. Consistent with the IDC on the Enterprise network equipment industry, a report 
issued by Dell’Oro Group titled “Five Year Forecast – Wireless LAN” also expected WLAN 
equipment sales growth to moderate over the coming years. Consider, for example, the following 
from their report issued in July of 2014:  
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“Growth drivers of the past five years are weakening, and while new drivers are 
emerging, we expect Y/Y growth will moderate. . ..  Over the next five years, we 
expect 802.11ac to be an even more powerful driver in units than 802.11n, and we 
expect strong Enterprise WLAN growth as it eventually overtakes Campus 
Ethernet switches as the network access method of choice.”
216
 
204. The expected growth in WLAN equipment and software as a result of the 
802.11ac standard presented an economic opportunity for Aruba since it was an early leader in 
WLAN technology. As an example of Aruba’s  leadership position in this area, consider the 
following table prepared by HP in November 2014: 
 
 
 ECONOMIC OUTLOOK217 B.
205. Following a contraction in 2008 and 2009, the US economy experienced a slow 
recovery. This recovery accelerated in 2013 and 2014, with the Congressional Budget Office 
                                                 
216
 Dell’Oro Group Report, “Five-Year Forecast – Wireless LAN,” July 22, 2014, p. 1 
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Select Competitive Benchmarking

























































(“CBO”) estimating that nominal and real GDP growth in 2014 were 4.0% and 2.1%, 
respectively.
218
 Despite recent improvements in the rate of economic growth, the CBO believes 
there to be excess capacity in the economy as well as excess supply in the labor market.
219
  The 
CBO estimates that this slack will be eliminated by the second half of 2017, eliminating 
downward pressure on inflation and interest rates.
220
  GDP growth is expected to accelerate in 
2015 and 2016, driven primarily by consumer spending and investment.
221
 After 2016, nominal 
economic growth is projected to moderate to approximately 4.2% in the years 2018-2025.
222
 This 
level of growth is lower than historical averages due to certain long-term trends, including the 
aging of the baby-boom generation and reduced work force growth.
223
 
206. Globally, monetary policy continued to be accommodating in 2015 with both the 
Bank of Japan expanding its quantitative easing program in October of 2014 and the European 
Central Bank expanding its asset purchase programs in January of 2015. Monetary policy has 
played a large role in bringing long-term interest rates to historic lows. Consider, for example, 
the following from the IMF’s April 2015 report on recent economic developments: 
“…the decline in long-term nominal interest rates appears to reflect primarily a 
decline in real interest rates, including a compression of term premiums and 
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reductions in the expected short-term neutral rate (see the April 2015 GFSR). 
Very accommodative monetary conditions have clearly played a role in the 
reduction in term premiums…”
224
 
207. Although the US Federal Reserve was expected to begin raising rates in 2015, 
historically low long-term interest rates, as well as continued monetary accommodation, were 
expected to continue to support economic growth moving forward. 
208. Stock markets have responded strongly to accommodative monetary policy, with 
the S&P 500 having more than doubled from recession-level lows and increasing 13% in the one 
year period prior to May 2015. In the eyes of some market participants, however, this 
performance left the market over-valued. Consider, for example, the following from a 
Morningstar report in March of 2015: 
“The S&P 500—at a level of 2,108—carries a Shiller price/earnings ratio of 
27.7—higher than 79% of monthly readings since 1989…Alternatively, the S&P 
500 is trading at 18.4 times trailing peak operating earnings, which is higher than 
77% of monthly readings since 1989. In both cases, such high valuation levels 
have historically been associated with poor subsequent five-year total returns and 
an elevated risk of material drawdown. Proceed with caution.”
225
 
 ANALYSIS OF THE FEBRUARY 2015 PROJECTIONS C.
209. On an annual basis, typically in the spring, Aruba management spent time 
developing a three-year strategic plan.
226
 The strategic plan was considered a top down review of 
Aruba’s operations as well as its future market opportunities.
227
 While the plan never appears to 
have been formally approved by the Aruba Board, it was the subject of a special full-day Aruba 
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Board meeting typically around June of each year.
228
  The Aruba Board challenged management 
with questions and issues to research and there was a back and forth engagement between 
management and the Aruba Board.
229
 The three-year plan also provided the basis for other 
shorter term projections completed by Aruba management.
230
  
210. On a shorter-term basis, Aruba also completed a 12-month annual operating plan 
or budget and a six-month plan. The latter was the only planning budget that was formally 
approved by the Aruba Board and served as the basis for employee compensation targets as well. 
An additional six-month budget was approved after the first period had elapsed. These six-month 
budgets also appear to have contributed to the quarterly forecasting that was completed for both 
internal and external purposes.   
211. In the spring of 2014, Aruba management developed the FY 2015 – FY 2017 
Strategic Plan that was eventually presented at the June 2014 Aruba Board meeting. Following 
that meeting, Bean reported to Aruba staff on the Aruba Board’s reception to the FY 2015 – FY 
2017 Strategic Plan: 
 “Overall the strategy plan outlined to the board was well received and they are in 
general agreement with the 3 year plan. . .   The overall tone from the board was 




212. In regards to FY 2015, Aruba management set several goals as summarized in a 
July 16, 2014 FY2015 Company Strategic Goal Summary: 
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“Goals for 2015 (1) Achieve aggressive 25% annual revenue growth; (2) Focus on 
needs of premium enterprise customers to grow sales to G2000 customers by 
[35%+] annually; (3) Increase overall software and subscription license sales by 
[25%+?? annually]; (4) Deliver innovative and differentiated mobility solutions to 
expand our CIO influence and sustain industry-leading 72%+ gross margins; (5) 
Create shareholder value by delivering consistent 20%+ operating margin.”
232
 
213. According to the Company’s custom, in June/August 2014, Aruba management 
prepared a three-year projection covering FY 2015 - FY 2017.  Subsequent to the preparation of 
the June/August 2014 projections, in October 2014, management prepared projections for FY 
2015 – FY 2017 (“October 2014 Projections”).  
214. At a special meeting of the Aruba Board held on February 2, 2015, Galvin 
presented preliminary Q2 2015 financial results and presented financial projections prepared by 
management (the “February 2015 Projections”).
233
 The February 2015 Projections represented an 
update to the October 2014 Projections to create projections for the balance of FY 2015 and for 
FY 2016 – FY 2017.  The October 2014 Projections were generally more optimistic than the 
February 2015 Projections, which are the focus of my analysis in this section. Exhibit 5 is a 
comparison between the February 2015 Projections and security analysts’ consensus estimates 
prepared by Qatalyst in February 2015. 
215. To assess the reasonableness of the February 2015 Projections, I reviewed and 
analyzed, among other things, the Company’s historical performance, deposition testimony of 
Galvin and Orr, contemporaneous security analyst coverage, internal emails, industry reports, 
internal strategic documents, Project Greyhound documents, and Aruba Board minutes and 
presentations. 
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216. The February 2015 Projections are consistent with the notion that Aruba was in 
the process of transforming itself from being primarily focused on revenue growth to working on 
improving its profitability while continuing to grow revenues. As Johansson stated in his 
deposition testimony: 
“So when we [HP] looked at them [Aruba], it was very important for us to 
understand what was the trajectory on the profits going to look like going 
forward. And at the time, Dom [Dominic Orr] and the company had publicly 
stated that they were going to start focusing more on improving profits going 
forward.  
So the company was in a little bit of a transition from that perspective, but -- so 




217. Based on my review of the February 2015 Projections and Galvin’s testimony 
regarding the process that was employed to develop those Projections, I believe that the February 
2015 Projections provide a reasonable set of expectations for the Company’s future performance.  
Therefore, I utilize the February 2015 Projections, as extended to five years by Qatalyst working 
in conjunction with Aruba management, in my analysis of Aruba’s value as of May 18, 2015. 
 TREATMENT OF STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION D.
218. As previously discussed, Aruba, like many technology companies, paid a portion 
of its employees’ compensation in SBC using both stock options and restricted stock. 
Historically, Aruba’s SBC as a percentage of revenues was larger than its peers, which was a 
concern of management and the Aruba Board.
235
 Management and the Aruba Board appeared to 
be committed to reducing the amount of SBC by favoring cash-based compensation going 
forward as well as minimizing any dilutive effect caused by the issuance of SBC through stock 
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repurchases. While I have not been able to determine the number of shares repurchased by Aruba 
over the FY 2009 – Q2 2015 period, an analysis of the dollar amount of repurchased stock and 
dollar amount of SBC over that time period are approximately equal, demonstrating Aruba’s 
commitment to minimizing any dilutive effects of its compensation plans. The following table 
compares the total stock repurchases and total SBC expensed during for FY 2009 – FY 2014 and 
the first half of FY 2015: 
 
 
219. Due to the importance of SBC in evaluating the value of Aruba, in particular its 
cash flow impact, I include the amounts projected by management as current expenses from a 
cash flow perspective. While new grants of SBC do not often have a current cash impact on the 
Company, the inclusion of the SBC amount is a reasonable approximation of the cash outflows 
for two reasons. First, grants from prior periods that become vested or exercisable are typically 
deducted for tax purposes. Second, the cash outflow associated with the repurchase of shares is 
effectively accounted for in the cash flow projections, given Aruba’s historical and projected 
intention to prevent dilution from its SBC grants. Further, the Company had sufficient projected 
free cash flow to accommodate the share repurchases without raising any external financing, 
although as mentioned above, external financing was seriously being considered at the Company.  





Stock Repurchases 1$         -$      -$      20$       86$       263$     105$     475$            
SBC Expense
Stock Options 12$       16$       19$       17$       10$       5$         1$         80$              
Stock Awards 10         16         39         59         77         97         39         337              
Employee Stock Purchase Plan 3           4           6           8           10         9           4           43                
Market Stock Units -        -        -        -        -        -        4           4                  
Total SBC Expense 25$       36$       64$       84$       96$       111$     48$       464$            
SBC % of Total Revenue 12% 14% 16% 16% 16% 15% 11%
Source: Company filings with the SEC.




220. My treatment of SBC was also employed in valuation analyses prepared by 
Evercore and Barclays, two of the three financial advisors who participated in the transaction. 
Only Qatalyst ignored this expense as part of the cash flow projection used in its DCF valuation. 
Qatalyst attempted to account for the impact of SBC by relying on a 28% dilution factor
236
 (a 
number that at one point had been 25% prior to the final fairness opinion being issued).
237
 
Furthermore, the Qatalyst cash flow projections appear to ignore any potential tax benefits 
associated with SBC. 
 DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW VALUATION E.
1. Basis for Free Cash Flow 
221. To project Aruba’s free cash flow for purposes of performing a DCF valuation, I 
began with the February 2015 Projections.
238
  In addition, I also reviewed a Qatalyst financial 
model, which provided the detail underlying the February 2015 Projections summarized in the 
Proxy.
239
 The projections covered the period FY 2015 - FY 2020.  The projections were based on 
the three-year strategic plan described above and then extended to 2020 by Qatalyst with input 
on the key assumptions from Aruba management.  As mentioned above, I deduct SBC in the 
Company’s projected cash flows. The same projection, excluding the SBC, is the basis for the 
projections utilized in the Qatalyst Fairness Opinion delivered to the Aruba Board.  
222. While I relied on the projections through July 31, 2020, I find that the length of 
time for the projection required extension to account for the time it would take for Aruba’s 
financial performance to normalize or to achieve a relatively level growth rate, which is 
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necessary to determine a reasonable terminal value. Consequently, I employ a three-stage cash 
flow model, with Stage One being the projection period included in the Proxy and Stage Two 
being an additional five-year period to allow for the 10% projected revenue growth in fiscal 2020 
to gradually decline, by approximately one percentage point per year, to a steady growth rate of 
3.5% in 2025, a rate that will be explained further below.
240
 Additional Stage Two assumptions 
include: maintained operating margins consistent with those in 2020, assumed that capital 
expenditures will equal depreciation, and assumed that working capital changes will be zero. 
Stage Three is the terminal year value that will be described below. 
2. Weighted Average Cost of Capital (“WACC”) 
223. Historically, including as of May 18, 2015, Aruba’s capital structure included no 
debt. As a 100% equity funded company, Aruba’s WACC is equal to its Cost of Equity. As 
previously discussed, prior to HP approaching Aruba about a potential transaction, Aruba was in 
the final stages of a $300 million convertible debt offering, a process that the Company began 
investigating as early as 2013 with at least one investment bank - Barclays.
241
 For purposes of 
my valuation, I have conservatively chosen not to include this debt in the capital structure despite 
the reasonable likelihood that Aruba would have issued it as a standalone company. Including 
the debt in the capital structure would have the effect of reducing Aruba’s WACC both as a 
result of the lower cost of debt and any potential positive information that the equity markets 
might attribute to the Company for being able to complete the offering or since the offering was 
in part being done to repurchase Company stock. 
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224. To assess Aruba’s Cost of Equity, which will serve as the WACC in my DCF 
analysis, I have employed the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”) to calculate 
beta (β).  Unsystematic risk (the risk attributed to a specific company) can be eliminated through 
portfolio diversification; therefore the CAPM attributes differences in returns on individual 
companies to differences in beta or systematic risk. The formula to determine the cost of equity 
using the CAPM is as follows: 
Ke = Rf + (Rm – Rf) + Rs where: 
Rf is the risk free rate 
 is beta, or the measure of systematic risk 
(Rm – Rf) is the equity risk premium for the entire market 
Rs is the return in excess of CAPM  
225. The risk-free rate (Rf ) used in the CAPM model represents the 20-year U.S. 
Treasury constant maturity rate, which was 2.75% as of May 18, 2015. For the risk premium, 




226. As required by the CAPM formula detailed above, the equity risk premium must 
be multiplied by the beta. To calculate the beta in the case of Aruba, I considered a beta that took 
into account both Aruba’s company-specific beta and the beta of a group of companies identified 
as comparable by two or more of the three financial advisors that participated in the transaction 
that represented both the WLAN and pure play networking markets (together “WLAN/ PPN”).
243
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227. For the Aruba-specific beta, I used a beta of .81 obtained from Bloomberg that 
was calculated on a two-year weekly basis ending on February 24, 2015, which represents the 
closest date ending two-years prior to the valuation date that is unaffected by the February 25, 
2015 Bloomberg Business article reporting a rumor of a transaction between Aruba and HP.
244
 
For the WLAN/PPN group, I used the beta calculated from the two-year weekly data as provided 
by Bloomberg as of the valuation date. I further unlevered these betas to make them comparable 
to Aruba’s beta since Aruba has no debt in its capital structure. The median unlevered beta for 
the WLAN/PPN group was 1.11 as of the valuation date.
245
  I then assigned a weight of two-
thirds to the Aruba-specific beta and one-third to the WLAN/PPN group unlevered beta, 
resulting in a beta of 0.91, which I utilized in determining Aruba’s WACC.
246
  The table below 
shows this calculation: 
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influenced by the transaction which led to the appraisal.” Shannon P. Pratt & Roger J. 
Grabowski, Cost of Capital in Litigation: Applications and Examples 32 (2011), p. 171. 
245
 Note that Arista Networks, Meru Networks, Aerohive and A10 Networks were excluded from 
this analysis due to the fact that there are not enough observations to calculate their two year 
beta. 
246
 Using Aruba’s company-specific beta (0.81) yields a WACC of 9.4% and an implied value of 
$35.83 per share.  I performed this calculation in order to check the reasonableness of my 
selected inputs. 






228. A two-year period for calculating beta was chosen as the period most 
representative of Aruba’s future beta, which is the ultimate goal to achieve in the selection of the 
time period. I came to this conclusion as a result of my analysis of the Company’s history and 
the transformative changes that have occurred at the Company and in the industry over the past 
several years. Utilizing a shorter period to determine beta due to changes in the subject 
company’s business has been discussed in academic literature. For example, consider the 
following from New York University Corporate Finance Professor Aswath Damodaran: 
“We must make three decisions in setting up the [beta calculation] described 
above. The first concerns the length of the estimation period…The tradeoff is 
simple: A longer estimation period provides more data, but the firm itself might 
have changed in its risk characteristics over the time period.”
247
 
“In choosing a time period for beta estimation, it is worth noting the trade off 
involved. By going back further in time, we get the advantage of having more 
observations in the regression, but this could be offset by the fact that the firm 
itself might have changed its characteristics, in terms of business mix and 
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 Damodaran, Aswath, “Corporate Finance Theory and Practice,” 2
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Ruckus Wireless 1.53             




F5 Networks 1.15             
Radware 1.07             
Median Unlevered Peer Group Beta 1.11             
Aruba Beta 0.81             
Weighted Beta (1) 0.91            
Source: Bloomberg.
Note: (1) Calculated using a 2/3 weight for Aruba's beta and 1/3 
weight for the median unlevered WLAN/PPN group beta.




leverage, over that period. Our objective is not to estimate the best beta we can 
over the last period but to obtain the best beta we can for the future.”
248
 
229. In this case, a two year beta was chosen due to the fact that Aruba had changed 
substantially over the period leading up to the deal, as previously discussed.  The Company had 
gone from being focused on revenue growth to focusing on earnings and had seen a substantial 
increase in its customer base.  Furthermore, the Company had added a significant number of 
additional employees, expanded its geographic footprint, and made a number of strategic 
acquisitions. This expansion changed the Company’s business mix and in my opinion, a two year 
beta represents the best approximation of Aruba’s market risk going forward.  
230. Since the CAPM does not fully account for the higher required rates of return of 
investors in small company stocks and tends to overstate the required returns of investors in large 
company stocks, an adjustment to the CAPM inputs discussed above is required. As reported in 
the Ibbotson SBBI Classic Yearbooks, the market is divided into ten deciles based on market 
capitalization. I chose the fifth decile, which contains companies with market capitalizations 
ranging from $2.5 billion to $3.7 billion as a result of a number of factors including, but not 
limited to, the value derived from my DCF valuation, contemporaneous analyst price targets with 
a median value of $26, and Aruba’s internal stock repurchase target of $25. Accordingly, I 
applied a size premium of 1.60% associated with the fifth decile.
249
  This approach provides a 
conservative estimate given the ultimate valuation conclusion that I reached since a larger 
company would typically require a smaller premium. 
231. Applying all of the variables discussed above as well as represented in Exhibit 6-
1, I have calculated Aruba’s WACC as of May 18, 2015 to be 10.0%. 
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 Ibbotson SBBI 2015 Classic Yearbook, p. 108 and p. 109 (Errata Table 7-6). 




3. Terminal Value 
232. The terminal value represents all cash flows into perpetuity following the final 
year of the discrete projection period. As a result, the terminal year should represent a relatively 
steady state for a company for the projection to be most relevant. By extending the projection 
period to ten years, I have maximized the likelihood that the final year of the projection is 
representative of such a steady state given the facts and circumstances for Aruba. 
233. Estimating an appropriate perpetuity growth rate (“PGR”) for a company is an 
important input in any DCF valuation. Based on the fact that the Company was an industry 
leader and growing rapidly, I found it reasonable to expect Aruba to grow at the rate of the 
overall economy in the long term. To estimate its long-term growth, I looked at the data in the 
table below showing various projections of long-term nominal GDP growth ranging from 4.2% 
to 4.4%.  
 
 
234. I selected a PGR of 3.5%, which is approximately between the risk free rate used 
in my DCF analysis (2.75%) and the projected nominal GDP growth rates presented above.  
235. To calculate the terminal value, or Stage Three value, I employed the Gordon 
Growth Model. The formula for using the Gordon Growth Model to determine the terminal value 
is: UFCF * [(1 + g)/ (k – g)] where UFCF represents the unlevered free cash flows projected in 








CBO Economic Outlook Apr-15 2.2% 2.0% 4.2%
Economic Report of the Feb-15 2.3% 2.0% 4.3%
EIA Energy Outlook Apr-15 2.4% 2.0% 4.4%
Median: 2.3% 2.0% 4.3%




I utilized the projected cash flow in year ten, employed the WACC of 10.0%, and determined 
that the most reasonable estimate of stable growth for Aruba was 3.5%.
250 
 
4. Discounted Cash Flow Valuation Conclusion 
236. In performing my DCF valuation, I used the February 2015 Projections as the 
basis for developing unlevered free cash flows. I extended the February 2015 Projections out to 
FY 2025 by gradually lowering Aruba’s growth rate. Using the CAPM, I calculated a discount 
rate of 10.0%. The PGR I used in calculating the terminal value represents a reasonable 
approximation of stable growth for the Company, as described above. The results of my DCF 
valuation are summarized in the following table that provides a sensitivity of values centered on 
a discount rate of 10.0% and a PGR of 3.5%: 
 
 
237. Based on the analysis I performed, it is my opinion that the fair value of Aruba’s 
common stock on May 18, 2015 was $32.57 per share (see Exhibit 7-1).  
 MARKET APPROACH – COMPARABLE COMPANY VALUATION F.
238. The Comparable Company Valuation establishes value by measuring a 
company’s normalized operating results against those of publicly traded comparable companies. 
For example, operating statement multiples are derived for each comparable, and the appropriate 
multiple is applied to the subject company’s particular operating metric to determine value. 
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 The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2015 – 2025, Congress of the United States, 
Congressional Budget Office, January 2015, p. 30. 
3.0% 3.5% 4.0%
9.5% 33.45$    35.05$    36.93$    
10.0% 31.15$    32.57$    34.00$    
















239. The cornerstone of any market-based approach is the comparability of the subject 
company to the companies to which it is compared. For purposes of my valuation of Aruba, I 
attempted to identify other publicly traded companies reasonably similar to Aruba in business 
strategy, financial performance, market position, end customers and other factors to insure the 
reasonableness of the indicated value. To identify potential comparable companies, I reviewed 
the companies utilized by Qatalyst, Evercore, and Barclays in their respective fairness opinions 
or valuation analyses, the companies identified in Aruba’s public filings as being competitors, 
and companies identified in security analysts’ reports covering the Company. Upon completion 
of my review of approximately 30 companies, I concluded that no single company or group of 
companies was sufficiently similar to Aruba to provide meaningful valuation comparisons. I 
therefore, do not rely on this methodology to assist in the determination of Aruba’s fair value. 
240. However, in performing my analysis, I did calculate a range of values for the 
WLAN/PPN Group despite my belief that these companies were not sufficiently comparable to 





Partners (1) Evercore (2) Barclays (3)
WLAN
Ubiquiti X X X X
Ruckus Wireless X X X X
Aerohive Networks X X X X
Meru Networks X
Pure Play Networking
F5 Networks X X X X
Arista Networks X X X X
Radware X X X X
A10 Networks X X X
Sources: (1) Project Athens, Materials for Discussion, March 2015, p. 28 (QP00009281).
(2) Project Athens, Supporting Valuation Analysis, March 1, 2015, p. 17 (EVERCORE00010303).
(3) Project Aspen, Board Materials, February 28, 2015, p. 7 (BARC-ARU_00031354).
Financial Advisor




241.  I observed valuation metrics for the WLAN/PPN Group. The results of this 
analysis is included in Exhibit 8-1. In all instances, a 20% premium was added to the results in 
order to eliminate the minority interest discount inherent in the analysis in order to arrive at the 
indicated fair value of Aruba that would be derived from the financial advisors’ analyses. 
242. Based on the testimony of Aruba’s management and my review of security 
analysts’ coverage of the Company, Aruba was in a transition period, where investors were 
beginning to focus more on the earnings capacity of the Company rather than its ability to grow 
revenues (even though revenue growth is generally an important factor in assessing the value of 
most businesses and the stock market’s response to the Company’s Q2 2015 revenue guidance 
provides additional evidence that the market had not completely abandoned revenues as a focus). 
As such, the emerging profitability that Aruba was experiencing in FY 2015 would  be less 
indicative of current value than the value derived from estimated 2016 forward earnings and 
revenue. Excluding the 2015 earnings multiples, the range of values is $18.98 per share to 
$37.21 per share. As mentioned above, I have not factored this analysis into my assessment of 
Aruba’s value in any way, but view it to be generally consistent with the value that I calculated 
utilizing the DCF valuation method. 
 MARKET APPROACH – COMPARABLE TRANSACTION VALUATION G.
243. Similar to the Comparable Company Valuation, the Comparable Transaction 
Valuation is heavily dependent upon the comparability of the transactions identified as being 
similar to the subject company. I attempted to identify comparable transactions by reviewing 
transactions identified by at least two of the three financial advisors as well as searching the 
FactSet database for transactions involving the acquisition of a majority stake announced 
between January 1, 2012 and May 18, 2015, but that closed by May 18, 2015. Furthermore, I 
limited my review of transactions to target companies operating in the information technology 




services, telecommunications equipment, computer peripherals, and communications industries 
that were 10x smaller or 10x larger than the Aruba Transaction.  
244. The results of this search yielded approximately 70 transactions, of which 
sufficient operating metric data for the target company (or business unit) was unavailable for 
approximately 40 of the transactions. With regard to the remaining 30 transactions where some 
information was available, I was not able to determine, what if any part of the transaction price 
was attributable to synergies. I concluded that no single transaction or group of transactions, 
where enough relevant information was available, was sufficiently similar to Aruba to provide 
meaningful valuation comparisons. I therefore, do not rely on this methodology to assist in the 
determination of Aruba’s fair value. 
 EXTERNAL CHECKS ON VALUATION H.
245. In addition to the Market Approaches to valuation described above, my review of 
the record and other publicly available information revealed additional indications of Aruba’s 
value. Those include (1) internal price discussions, and (2) the existence of an internal PT for the 
repurchase of shares. 
246. Prior to August 2014, Galvin was not aware of anyone having performed an 
analysis to determine Aruba’s intrinsic value.
251
 However, there is evidence from Aruba and 
Qatalyst as to what represented a reasonable range for the Company’s stock. One indication of 
value is found in Aruba’s negotiations with Qatalyst on the engagement letter between the two 
firms. In negotiating the terms of the engagement letter, Aruba and Qatalyst suggested different 
terms for Qatalyst’s fee. In a September 4 and 5, 2014 email exchange between Orr, Galvin and 
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Hahn, these Aruba executives discussed Qatalyst’s potential fee based on a transaction price of 
over $30 per share. Hahn initiated the email exchange by stating: 
“Q feels that $36 is too high a bar for 1.25% as it is a 70% premium and not 
likely. They could see 1.5% for $36. They feel the breakpoint for 1.25% should be 
around $30. What they positioned was essentially 1.25% for what they think is the 
most likely outcome (around $30): a linear structure with 1% up to $30, 1.25 
increasing to 1.5% linearly for $30-$36, 1.5% for $36+.”
252
 
247. Galvin followed Hahn’s observation by writing “He [Boutros] emphasized $30 is 
a 50% premium over our trailing 30 day avg. I countered with it’s universally thought that 
ARUN is undervalued right now.”
253
 
248. Orr concluded the dialogue stating that the Aruba Board did not want to sell the 
Company for less than $30 per share and that he wanted a transaction price over $33 per share. 
Specifically, Orr wrote: 
“Netting out my webchats: board doesn’t want deal below $30; I want it above 
$33 . . .  I’m not comfy of a ramp from 30 to 33. It would not be spicy enough to 
focus on the 33-35 target range we want.”
254
 
249. While the provision Orr, Galvin, and Hahn discussed with Qatalyst was not 
included in the final engagement letter, it is still noteworthy that the parties were discussing a 
transaction in the $30+ per share range. 
250. As previously discussed, Aruba maintained an active share repurchase program. 
At the September 2, 2014 Aruba Board meeting: “The Board determined to allow repurchases 
within the existing limits previously approved (no more than $25 million per quarter at prices no 
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 Email from Ava Hahn to Dominic Orr, Subject: Re: Qatalyst update – PRIV/CONF, 
September 4, 2014 (ARUN008302). 
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 Email from Mike Galvin, September 4, 2014 (ARUN008301). 
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 Email from Dominic Orr to Mike Galvin, Subject: Re: Qatalyst update – PRIV/CONF, 
September 5, 2014 (ARUN008301). 




higher than $25/share) and consistent with past practice, given the highly preliminary nature of 
discussions with Helsinki [HP].”
255
 The existence of this $25.00 per share price implies that the 
Aruba Board believed that the intrinsic value of the Company exceeded $25.00 per share since it 
would not likely repurchase shares at a value that exceeded the Company’s intrinsic value. 
Further, the repurchase value is based on the minority price paid for the shares. Adding a 20% 
premium in order to eliminate the inherent minority interest discount arrives at a value of $30.00 
per share.  
251. Finally, in an email dated March 13, 2015 (after the merger agreement was 
signed), Aruba management estimated that the standalone value of the Company was between 
$400 million and $1.8 billion more than what HP paid in the deal.
256
 A DCF valuation performed 
using management’s model without synergies produced a valuation ranging from $3.1 to $4.5 
billion according to Galvin. 
VII. LIMITING FACTORS AND OTHER ASSUMPTIONS  
252. This report is furnished solely for the benefit of the parties, counsel and the Court 
in the matter of Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd., et al. v. Aruba Networks, Inc. This report 
may not be relied upon by any other person or entity without my express, prior written consent. 
Any disclosure of this report, whether or not consented to, shall not create any obligation or 
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 Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Directors of Aruba Networks, Inc., September 2, 2014, 
p. 1 (ArubaAA0001780). See also Galvin Dep. at pp. 93 – 95. 
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 Email from J. Brown to D. Orr re HP Financial View of Aruba Acquisition, dated March 13, 
2015 (ArubaAA0503223-24) (Galvin Ex. 49) (“At a $2.7b deal price (net of cash), HP would 
want to receive value of more than $2.7b of value on a discounted cash flow basis. … Based on 
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FY20), we would deliver a valuation of $3.1b to $4.5b depending on what discount rate they 
may use …”). See also Galvin Dep. at 318-320. 




liability on Paul A. Marcus. This report is delivered subject to the conditions, scope of 
engagement, limitations and understandings set forth in this report. 
253. Neither all nor any part of the contents of this report should be conveyed to the 
public through advertising, public relations, news, sales, mail, direct transmittal, or other media, 
without my prior written consent and approval. 
254. In accordance with recognized professional ethics, my professional fees for this 
service are not contingent upon the opinion expressed herein, and I do not have a present or 
intended financial interest in the outcome of this matter. 
255. Public information, statistical information and data are from sources I deem to be 
reliable. However, I make no representation as to the accuracy or completeness of such 
information and data. 
256. It should be understood that I have reviewed numerous documents related to this 
matter and I have set forth in this report only a summary of the testimony I expect to provide at 
trial. I have not attempted to set forth verbatim every fact that supports my opinion. I reserve the 
right to supplement or amend this report should any additional information become available. 
Dated: July 29, 2016  
 
_____________________________________ 
Paul A. Marcus, CFA, CFE 
PM Financial Expert Consultants, LLC 
 
